extracting-memory-artifacts-with-rekall

name: extracting-memory-artifacts-with-rekall description: 'Uses Rekall memory forensics framework to analyze memory dumps for process hollowing, injected code via VAD anomalies, hidden processes, and rootkit detection. Applies plugins like pslist, psscan, vadinfo, malfind, and dlllist to extract forensic artifacts from Windows memory images. Use during incident response memory analysis.

' domain: cybersecurity subdomain: security-operations tags:

• extracting
• memory
• artifacts
• with version: '1.0' author: mahipal license: Apache-2.0 nist_csf:
• DE.CM-01
• RS.MA-01
• GV.OV-01
• DE.AE-02

Extracting Memory Artifacts with Rekall

When to Use

• When performing authorized security testing that involves extracting memory artifacts with rekall
• When analyzing malware samples or attack artifacts in a controlled environment
• When conducting red team exercises or penetration testing engagements
• When building detection capabilities based on offensive technique understanding

Detection Gaps & Validation

• Profile mismatch returns empty output, not "clean": Rekall's autodetect=["rsds"] and remote profile fetch fail closed — a wrong/missing profile makes pslist, malfind, and netscan yield nothing. Note that Rekall is archived/unmaintained and struggles with recent Windows 10/11 builds; if results look empty, suspect profile/version, not absence of compromise, and cross-check with Volatility 3.
• Acquisition smear and page-file gaps: a live dump captured on a busy host can tear EPROCESS lists so pslist (active-list walk) drops processes; injected pages may be paged out and absent from the raw image. Diff pslist against psscan (pool scan) to surface unlinked/hidden PIDs, and document the acquisition method.
• malfind misses fileless/reflective loads with normal protections: process hollowing that restores legitimate PAGE_EXECUTE_READ and matching VAD names evades the RWX/private-memory heuristic. Corroborate with vadinfo mismatches (mapped image vs. on-disk), ldrmodules for unlinked DLLs, and dlllist vs. ldrmodules gaps.
• Rootkit hooks need explicit checks: hidden network sockets and SSDT/IRP hooks won't show in netscan/pslist alone — run the hook/callback plugins too.
• Validate the workflow fires: in a lab, inject shellcode (e.g., a benign hollowed notepad) and confirm malfind flags the RWX VAD and the psscan-pslist diff reveals a hidden test PID before trusting findings on real evidence.

Prerequisites

• Familiarity with security operations concepts and tools
• Access to a test or lab environment for safe execution
• Python 3.8+ with required dependencies installed
• Appropriate authorization for any testing activities

Instructions

Use Rekall to analyze memory dumps for signs of compromise including process injection, hidden processes, and suspicious network connections.

from rekall import session
from rekall import plugins

# Create a Rekall session with a memory image
s = session.Session(
    filename="/path/to/memory.raw",
    autodetect=["rsds"],
    profile_path=["https://github.com/google/rekall-profiles/raw/master"]
)

# List processes
for proc in s.plugins.pslist():
    print(proc)

# Detect injected code
for result in s.plugins.malfind():
    print(result)

Key analysis steps:

1. Load memory image and auto-detect profile
2. Run pslist and psscan to find hidden processes
3. Use malfind to detect injected/hollowed code in process VADs
4. Examine network connections with netscan
5. Extract suspicious DLLs and drivers with dlllist/modules

Examples

from rekall import session
s = session.Session(filename="memory.raw")
# Compare pslist vs psscan for hidden processes
pslist_pids = set(p.pid for p in s.plugins.pslist())
psscan_pids = set(p.pid for p in s.plugins.psscan())
hidden = psscan_pids - pslist_pids
print(f"Hidden PIDs: {hidden}")