detecting-beaconing-patterns-with-zeek

name: detecting-beaconing-patterns-with-zeek description: 'Performs statistical analysis of Zeek conn.log connection intervals to detect C2 beaconing patterns. Uses the ZAT library to load Zeek logs into Pandas DataFrames, calculates inter-arrival time standard deviation, and flags periodic connections with low jitter. Use when hunting for command-and-control callbacks in network data.

' domain: cybersecurity subdomain: security-operations tags:

• detecting
• beaconing
• patterns
• with version: '1.0' author: mahipal license: Apache-2.0 nist_csf:
• DE.CM-01
• RS.MA-01
• GV.OV-01
• DE.AE-02

Detecting Beaconing Patterns with Zeek

When to Use

• When investigating security incidents that require detecting beaconing patterns with zeek
• When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
• When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
• When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques

Detection Gaps & Validation

• Jitter defeats low-std-dev rules: modern C2 (Cobalt Strike jitter, Sliver, malleable profiles) randomizes sleep ±20–50%, inflating the standard deviation so a raw std_dev-only test misses it. Use the coefficient of variation (CV = std/mean) and also bucket inter-arrival times into a histogram / FFT to find a dominant period despite jitter; flag CV below ~0.1–0.3 rather than near-zero.
• Too few samples = false negative: the len(intervals) > 10 gate silently skips slow beacons (hourly/daily callbacks) over short capture windows. Beaconing detection needs long-haul conn.log data (24h+); state the window and don't treat short captures as clean.
• Connection merging/long-lived sessions hide periodicity: keep-alive or HTTP/2 multiplexed sessions appear as one long duration row, not repeated connections — supplement timing with small, consistent orig_bytes/resp_bytes per connection (data-size regularity is a strong beacon signal).
• Destination evasion: beacons to CDNs, domain-fronted fronts, or rotating IPs scatter across id.resp_h. Group by SNI/server_name (ssl.log) or destination domain, not just resp IP.
• Validate the query fires: generate a synthetic beacon (e.g., curl in a 60s cron with random jitter) into the test conn.log and confirm the src/dst pair surfaces with low CV. FP tuning: NTP, software-update pollers, telemetry, and monitoring agents beacon legitimately — allowlist known destinations and known service accounts before alerting.

Prerequisites

• Familiarity with security operations concepts and tools
• Access to a test or lab environment for safe execution
• Python 3.8+ with required dependencies installed
• Appropriate authorization for any testing activities

Instructions

Load Zeek conn.log data using ZAT (Zeek Analysis Tools), group connections by source/destination pairs, and compute timing statistics to identify beaconing.

from zat.log_to_dataframe import LogToDataFrame
import numpy as np

log_to_df = LogToDataFrame()
conn_df = log_to_df.create_dataframe('/path/to/conn.log')

# Group by src/dst pair and calculate inter-arrival time
for (src, dst), group in conn_df.groupby(['id.orig_h', 'id.resp_h']):
    times = group['ts'].sort_values()
    intervals = times.diff().dt.total_seconds().dropna()
    if len(intervals) > 10:
        std_dev = np.std(intervals)
        mean_interval = np.mean(intervals)
        # Low std_dev relative to mean = likely beaconing

Key analysis steps:

1. Parse Zeek conn.log into DataFrame with ZAT LogToDataFrame
2. Group connections by source IP and destination IP pairs
3. Calculate inter-arrival time intervals between consecutive connections
4. Compute standard deviation and coefficient of variation
5. Flag pairs with low coefficient of variation as potential beacons

Examples

from zat.log_to_dataframe import LogToDataFrame
log_to_df = LogToDataFrame()
df = log_to_df.create_dataframe('conn.log')
print(df[['id.orig_h', 'id.resp_h', 'ts', 'duration']].head())