implementing-zero-knowledge-proof-for-authentication

name: implementing-zero-knowledge-proof-for-authentication description: Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) allow a prover to demonstrate knowledge of a secret (such as a password or private key) without revealing the secret itself. This skill implements the Schnorr identificati domain: cybersecurity subdomain: cryptography tags:

• cryptography
• zero-knowledge-proof
• authentication
• privacy
• zkp version: '1.0' author: mahipal license: Apache-2.0 nist_csf:
• PR.DS-01
• PR.DS-02
• PR.DS-10

Implementing Zero-Knowledge Proof for Authentication

Overview

Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) allow a prover to demonstrate knowledge of a secret (such as a password or private key) without revealing the secret itself. This skill implements the Schnorr identification protocol and a simplified ZKPP (Zero-Knowledge Password Proof) using the discrete logarithm problem, enabling authentication where the server never learns the user's password.

When to Use

• When deploying or configuring implementing zero knowledge proof for authentication capabilities in your environment
• When establishing security controls aligned to compliance requirements
• When building or improving security architecture for this domain
• When conducting security assessments that require this implementation

Common Misconfigurations & Verification

• Predictable challenge / nonce reuse: in Schnorr, reusing the commitment randomness r across two challenges leaks the secret x via x = (s1 - s2)/(c1 - c2). Generate r from a CSPRNG per proof and never reuse it. Verify two runs produce different t values.
• Weak Fiat-Shamir transcript: the non-interactive challenge must hash the full transcript including the public key and commitment (c = H(g, y, t, msg)), not just t — otherwise proofs are forgeable or transferable. Use a collision-resistant hash.
• Verifier-chosen challenge skipped / replay: without binding to a fresh server nonce or message, a captured transcript can be replayed. Include a server-supplied challenge or message and reject duplicates.
• Insecure group parameters: use a safe prime p and prime-order subgroup q; validate that y lies in the correct subgroup to avoid small-subgroup attacks.
• Secret transmitted or logged: confirm the server never receives or stores x.
• Mandatory tests: (1) honest prover always verifies (completeness); (2) a random/forged response without x fails verification (soundness); (3) the server transcript never contains the secret (zero-knowledge); (4) repeated authentications yield distinct transcripts; (5) a replayed transcript is rejected.

Prerequisites

• Familiarity with cryptography concepts and tools
• Access to a test or lab environment for safe execution
• Python 3.8+ with required dependencies installed
• Appropriate authorization for any testing activities

Objectives

• Implement Schnorr's identification protocol for ZKP authentication
• Build a non-interactive ZKP using Fiat-Shamir heuristic
• Implement zero-knowledge password proof (ZKPP)
• Demonstrate completeness, soundness, and zero-knowledge properties
• Compare ZKP authentication with traditional password verification

Key Concepts

ZKP Properties

Schnorr Protocol

1. Setup: Public generator g, prime p, q (order of g)
2. Registration: Prover computes y = g^x mod p (public key from secret x)
3. Commitment: Prover sends t = g^r mod p (random r)
4. Challenge: Verifier sends random c
5. Response: Prover sends s = r + c*x mod q
6. Verify: Check g^s == t * y^c mod p

Security Considerations

• Use cryptographically secure random number generators
• Challenge must be unpredictable (from verifier's perspective)
• For non-interactive proofs, use Fiat-Shamir with collision-resistant hash
• ZKP alone does not provide forward secrecy; combine with TLS

Validation Criteria

• Honest prover always verifies successfully (completeness)
• Random response without secret does not verify (soundness)
• Server never receives the secret value
• Non-interactive proof is verifiable offline
• Multiple authentications produce different transcripts
• Protocol resists replay attacks