semgrep

name: semgrep description: > USE FOR: Writing and running pattern-based static analysis rules for C# to detect security vulnerabilities, enforce coding standards, find anti-patterns, and automate code migrations. DO NOT USE FOR: Compile-time diagnostics (use Roslyn analyzers), dependency-level metrics (use NDepend), or runtime security scanning (use OWASP ZAP or Burp Suite). license: MIT metadata: displayName: Semgrep for .NET author: "Tyler-R-Kendrick" version: "1.0.0" compatibility:

• claude
• copilot
• cursor references:
• title: "Semgrep Documentation" url: "https://semgrep.dev/docs/"
• title: "Semgrep GitHub Repository" url: "https://github.com/semgrep/semgrep"
• title: "Semgrep Community Rules" url: "https://github.com/semgrep/semgrep-rules"

Semgrep for .NET

Overview

Semgrep is an open-source, language-aware static analysis tool that matches source code patterns using a concise rule syntax. Unlike regex-based tools, Semgrep understands the abstract syntax tree (AST), so it can match patterns regardless of formatting, variable names, or whitespace. For C# projects, Semgrep detects security vulnerabilities (SQL injection, XSS, insecure deserialization), enforces coding standards, and finds anti-patterns without requiring compilation or access to the .NET SDK.

Semgrep rules are written in YAML and use metavariables ($X, $TYPE) to capture code elements. Rules can include pattern, pattern-not, pattern-inside, and pattern-either operators for precise matching. Semgrep also supports autofix for automated remediation.

Installation and Basic Usage

# Install via pip
pip install semgrep

# Or via Homebrew
brew install semgrep

# Run with community rules for C#
semgrep --config=auto --lang=csharp .

# Run with a specific rule file
semgrep --config=./rules/csharp-security.yml .

# Run with Semgrep Registry rules
semgrep --config=p/csharp .

Writing Custom Rules

SQL Injection Detection

# rules/sql-injection.yml
rules:
  - id: csharp-sql-injection-string-concat
    patterns:
      - pattern: |
          $CMD.CommandText = $PREFIX + $INPUT + $SUFFIX;
      - pattern-not: |
          $CMD.CommandText = $PREFIX + $CONST + $SUFFIX;
        metavariable-type:
          metavariable: $CONST
          type: string
    message: >
      SQL query built with string concatenation using '$INPUT'.
      This is vulnerable to SQL injection. Use parameterized queries
      with SqlParameter instead.
    severity: ERROR
    languages: [csharp]
    metadata:
      cwe: "CWE-89: SQL Injection"
      owasp: "A03:2021 - Injection"
    fix: |
      $CMD.CommandText = "SELECT * FROM Users WHERE Id = @id";
      $CMD.Parameters.AddWithValue("@id", $INPUT);

The rule matches code like:

using System.Data.SqlClient;

public class UserRepository
{
    // Semgrep will flag this as sql-injection
    public void GetUser(SqlConnection conn, string userId)
    {
        var cmd = new SqlCommand();
        cmd.Connection = conn;
        cmd.CommandText = "SELECT * FROM Users WHERE Id = " + userId + ";";
        // ^ Semgrep flags: SQL query built with string concatenation
    }

    // Correct: parameterized query (not flagged)
    public void GetUserSafe(SqlConnection conn, string userId)
    {
        var cmd = new SqlCommand("SELECT * FROM Users WHERE Id = @id", conn);
        cmd.Parameters.AddWithValue("@id", userId);
    }
}

Insecure Deserialization

# rules/insecure-deserialization.yml
rules:
  - id: csharp-insecure-json-deserialization
    pattern: |
      JsonConvert.DeserializeObject<$TYPE>($INPUT)
    message: >
      Newtonsoft.Json deserialization of '$INPUT' into '$TYPE' without
      TypeNameHandling restriction. If TypeNameHandling is set to Auto
      or All in settings, this enables remote code execution.
      Use System.Text.Json or set TypeNameHandling.None explicitly.
    severity: WARNING
    languages: [csharp]
    metadata:
      cwe: "CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data"

  - id: csharp-binaryformatter-deserialization
    pattern: |
      new BinaryFormatter().Deserialize($STREAM)
    message: >
      BinaryFormatter.Deserialize is inherently unsafe and enables
      remote code execution. BinaryFormatter is obsolete in .NET 8+.
      Use System.Text.Json, MessagePack, or protobuf-net instead.
    severity: ERROR
    languages: [csharp]
    metadata:
      cwe: "CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data"

Enforcing Async Best Practices

# rules/async-best-practices.yml
rules:
  - id: csharp-async-void-method
    pattern: |
      async void $METHOD(...)
      {
        ...
      }
    pattern-not: |
      async void $METHOD(object $SENDER, $EVENTARGS_TYPE $E)
      {
        ...
      }
    message: >
      Async void method '$METHOD' detected. Async void methods cannot
      be awaited and exceptions will crash the process. Use async Task
      instead. Exception: event handlers with (object sender, EventArgs e)
      signature are allowed.
    severity: WARNING
    languages: [csharp]
    fix: |
      async Task $METHOD(...)
      {
        ...
      }

  - id: csharp-task-result-blocking
    patterns:
      - pattern-either:
          - pattern: $TASK.Result
          - pattern: $TASK.GetAwaiter().GetResult()
      - pattern-inside: |
          async $RETURN_TYPE $METHOD(...)
          {
            ...
          }
    message: >
      Blocking on '$TASK.Result' or 'GetAwaiter().GetResult()' inside
      an async method can cause deadlocks. Use 'await $TASK' instead.
    severity: ERROR
    languages: [csharp]

Detecting Missing Disposal

# rules/missing-disposal.yml
rules:
  - id: csharp-httpclient-in-using
    pattern: |
      using var $CLIENT = new HttpClient();
    message: >
      Creating HttpClient with 'using' disposes the client after each
      request, preventing socket reuse and causing socket exhaustion.
      Use IHttpClientFactory or a static/singleton HttpClient instead.
    severity: WARNING
    languages: [csharp]
    metadata:
      cwe: "CWE-404: Improper Resource Shutdown or Release"

  - id: csharp-undisposed-stream
    patterns:
      - pattern: |
          $STREAM = new $STREAM_TYPE(...);
      - metavariable-regex:
          metavariable: $STREAM_TYPE
          regex: "(FileStream|MemoryStream|StreamReader|StreamWriter|NetworkStream)"
      - pattern-not-inside: |
          using ...
          {
            ...
          }
      - pattern-not-inside: |
          using var $STREAM = ...;
    message: >
      Stream '$STREAM' of type '$STREAM_TYPE' is not wrapped in a
      using statement. This can lead to resource leaks.
    severity: WARNING
    languages: [csharp]

Semgrep Pattern Operators

CI/CD Integration

GitHub Actions

# .github/workflows/semgrep.yml
name: Semgrep
on: [push, pull_request]

jobs:
  semgrep:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    container:
      image: semgrep/semgrep
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
      - name: Run Semgrep
        run: |
          semgrep scan \
            --config=p/csharp \
            --config=./rules/ \
            --error \
            --json --output=semgrep-results.json \
            .
      - name: Upload Results
        if: always()
        uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
        with:
          name: semgrep-results
          path: semgrep-results.json

Semgrep vs. Roslyn Analyzers

Best Practices

1. Start with the p/csharp community ruleset from the Semgrep Registry before writing custom rules to cover common security vulnerabilities and anti-patterns without duplicating existing work.

2. Use pattern-not and pattern-not-inside to reduce false positives by explicitly excluding safe patterns (e.g., excluding parameterized queries from SQL injection rules, excluding event handlers from async-void rules).

3. Set severity: ERROR for security-critical rules and severity: WARNING for style/best-practice rules so that CI pipelines can use --error to fail on security findings while allowing warnings to pass.

4. Include metadata.cwe and metadata.owasp fields in security rules to map findings to standardized vulnerability classifications, making it easier to prioritize remediation and report to compliance teams.

5. Write autofix templates using fix: for mechanical transformations like replacing async void with async Task or wrapping streams in using statements, enabling developers to apply fixes with a single command.

6. Store custom rules in a rules/ directory at the repository root and reference them with --config=./rules/ to version-control your organization's rules alongside the codebase and share them across repositories.

7. Use metavariable-regex to narrow matches by type name or method name patterns when full type resolution is not available; this prevents false positives on similarly-named but unrelated APIs.

8. Run Semgrep in CI with --json --output=results.json and upload results as artifacts so that findings can be reviewed in pull request comments, tracked over time, and ingested by security dashboards.

9. Test every custom rule with at least one positive match and one negative match by creating test files with // ruleid: your-rule-id and // ok: your-rule-id annotations and running semgrep --test.

10. Combine Semgrep with Roslyn analyzers for defense in depth -- use Semgrep for security patterns and quick cross-language checks, and Roslyn analyzers for type-aware rules that require semantic model access.