w3c-vcdm-zkp-advanced - SKILL.md Agent Skill

name: "w3c-vcdm-zkp-advanced" description: "Use when implementing advanced W3C VCDM features beyond basic credential structure. Covers: zero-knowledge proofs, time, authorization, and reserved extensions." sections: - "5.7 Zero-Knowledge Proofs" - "5.8 Representing Time" - "5.9 AuthorizationThis section is non-normative." - "5.10 Reserved Extension Points"

5.7 Zero-Knowledge Proofs

Zero-knowledge proofs are securing mechanisms which enable a holder to prove that they hold a verifiable credential containing a value without disclosing the actual value such as being able to prove that an individual is over the age of 25 without revealing their birthday. This data model supports being secured using zero-knowledge proofs.

Some capabilities that are compatible with verifiable credentials which are made possible by zero-knowledge proof mechanisms include:

Selective disclosure of the properties in a verifiable credential by the holder to a verifier. This allows a holder to provide a verifier with precisely the information they need and nothing more. This also enables the production of a derived verifiable credential that is formatted according to the verifier's data schema without needing to involve the issuer during presentation. This provides a great deal of flexibility for holders to use their issued verifiable credentials.

Unlinkable disclosure of the properties in a verifiable credential by the holder to a verifier. Blinded signatures allow for unlinkable disclosure, which remove a common source of holder correlation during multiple presentations to one or more verifiers. This allows a holder to share a different signature value with each presentation, which in turn reduces the amount of data shared.

Non-correlatable identification of the holder and/or subject. This allows a holder to prove that a credential was issued to them, or a subject to prove that a credential was issued about them, without sharing a correlatable identifier. This also reduces the amount of data necessary to be shared. This capability can also be used to combine multiple verifiable credentials from multiple issuers into a single verifiable presentation without revealing verifiable credential or subject identifiers to the verifier.

Specification authors that create securing mechanisms MUST NOT design them in such a way that they leak information that would enable the verifier to correlate a holder across multiple verifiable presentations to different verifiers.

Not all capabilities are supported in all zero-knowledge proof mechanisms. Specific details about the capabilities and techniques provided by a particular zero knowledge proof mechanism, along with any normative requirements for using them with verifiable credentials, would be found in a specification for securing verifiable credentials with that zero-knowledge proof mechanism. For an example of such a specification, refer to the Data Integrity BBS Cryptosuites v1.0.

We note that in most instances, for the holder to make use of zero knowledge mechanisms with verifiable credentials, the issuer is required to secure the verifiable credential in a manner that supports these capabilities.

The diagram below highlights how the data model might be used to issue and present verifiable credentials in zero-knowledge.

      [Figure 12](https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model-2.0/#fig-a-visual-example-of-the-relationship-between-credentials-and-derived-credentials-in-a-zkp-presentation)

A visual example of the relationship between credentials and derived credentials in a ZKP presentation.

An example of a verifiable credential and a verifiable presentation using the Data Integrity BBS Cryptosuites v1.0 unlinkable selective disclosure securing mechanism is shown below.

[Example 30](https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model-2.0/#example-verifiable-credential-using-the-data-integrity-bbs-cryptosuite-with-a-base-proof): Verifiable credential using the Data Integrity BBS Cryptosuite with a Base Proof

{
  "@context": [
 "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
 "https://w3id.org/citizenship/v3"
  ],
  "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "PermanentResidentCard"],
  "issuer": {
 "id": "did:web:credentials.utopia.example",
 "image": "...YII="
  },
  "identifier": "83627465",
  "name": "Permanent Resident Card",
  "description": "Government of Utopia Permanent Resident Card.",
  "validFrom": "2024-08-01T00:00:00Z",
  "validUntil": "2029-12-01T00:00:00Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
 "type": ["PermanentResident", "Person"],
 "givenName": "JANE",
 "familyName": "SMITH",
 "gender": "Female",
 "image": "...Jggg==",
 "residentSince": "2015-01-01",
 "lprCategory": "C09",
 "lprNumber": "999-999-999",
 "commuterClassification": "C1",
 "birthCountry": "Arcadia",
 "birthDate": "1978-07-17"
  },
  "proof": {
 "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
 "verificationMethod": "did:web:playground.alpha.chapi.io#zUC75LjjCLGKRxSissX1nAebRDmY4Bv4T6MAbzgaap9Q8rAGf6SEjc2Hf4nH6bUPDwky3GWoYcUjMCcEqRRQfXEiNwfeDwNYLoeqk1J1W2Ye8vCdwv4fSd8AZ1yS6UoNzcsQoPS",
 "cryptosuite": "bbs-2023",
 "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
 "proofValue": "u2V0ChVhQjYs9O7wUb3KRSMaIRX7jmafVHYDPYBLD4ta85_qmuXTBU_t2Ir7pNujwRE6fERsBUEZRSjJjtI-hqOqDs3VvBvH6gd3o2KeUS2V_zpuphPpYQEkapOeQgRTak9lHKSTqEQqa4j2lyHqekEeGvzPlqcHQGFccGifvLUXtP59jCuGJ86HDA9HL5kDzUT6n4Gi50HlYYIzNqhbjIxlqOuxO2IgIppSTWjQGeer34-PmKnOzKX8m_9DHPhif7TUf5uTV4OQWdhb0SxHnJ-CPu_z9FJ5ACekBQhz6YWS0_CY6j_ibucXzeVfZwLv1W47pjbt-l1Vl5VggSn2xVt69Q0GD9mPKpOhkKV_hyOL7i6haf7bq-gOKAwWDZy9pc3N1ZXJtL2lzc3VhbmNlRGF0ZW8vZXhwaXJhdGlvbkRhdGU"
  }
}

The example above is a verifiable credential where the issuer has enabled a BBS-based unlinkable disclosure scheme to create a base proof that can then be used by the holder to create a derived proof that reveals only particular pieces of information from the original verifiable credential.

[Example 31](https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model-2.0/#example-verifiable-presentation-using-the-data-integrity-bbs-cryptosuite-with-a-derived-credential-and-proof): Verifiable presentation using the Data Integrity BBS Cryptosuite with a derived credential and proof

{
  @context: "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2"
  type: "VerifiablePresentation",
  verifiableCredential: {
 "@context": [
   "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
   "https://w3id.org/citizenship/v3"
 ],
 "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "PermanentResidentCard"],
 "issuer": {
   "id": "did:web:issuer.utopia.example",
   "image": "...YII="
 },
 "name": "Permanent Resident Card",
 "description": "Government of Utopia Permanent Resident Card.",
 "validFrom": "2024-08-01T00:00:00Z",
 "validUntil": "2029-12-01T00:00:00Z",
 "credentialSubject": {
   "type": ["PermanentResident", "Person"],
   "birthCountry": "Arcadia"
 },
 "proof": {
   type: "DataIntegrityProof",
   verificationMethod: "did:web:issuer.utopia.example#zUC75LjjCLGKRxSissX1nAebRDmY4Bv4T6MAbzgaap9Q8rAGf6SEjc2Hf4nH6bUPDwky3GWoYcUjMCcEqRRQfXEiNwfeDwNYLoeqk1J1W2Ye8vCdwv4fSd8AZ1yS6UoNzcsQoPS",
   cryptosuite: "bbs-2023",
   proofPurpose: "assertionMethod",
   proofValue: "u2V0DhVkCkLdnshxHtgeHJBBUGPBqcEooPp9ahgqs08RsoqW5EJFmsi70jqf2X368VcmfdJdYcYJwObPIg5dlyaoBm34N9BqcZ4RlTZvgwX79ivGnqLALC0EqKn2wOj5hRO76xUakfLGIcT4mE-G7CxA1FTs8sRCWy5p6FozelBYiZU2YlhUpJ7pBwelZ9wnlcbj4q-KyxAj5GU2iWp7-FxU-E624DmdT-yvCkAGRRrYej6lMwg7jB9uCHypOXXH2dVZ-jpf74YBaE4rMTxPFh60GN4o3S65F1fMsJbEMLdrXa8Vs6ZSlmveUcY1X7oPr1UIxo17ehVTCjOxWunYqrtLi9cVkYOD2s9XMk1oFVWBB3UY29axXQQXlZVfvTIUsfVc667mnlYbF7a-ko_SUfeY2n3s1DOAap5keeNU0v2KVPCbxA2WGz7UJy4xJv2a8olMOWPKjAEUruCx_dsbyicd-9KGwhYoUEO3HoAzmtI6qXVhMbJKxPrhtcp8hOdD9izVS5ed4CxHNaDGPSopF_MBwjxwPcpUufNNNdQwesrbtFJo0-P-1CrX_jSxKFMle2b3t24UbHRbZw7QnX4OG-SSVucem5jpMXTDFZ8PLFCqXX0zncJ_MQ-_u-liE-MwJu3ZemsXBp1JoB2twS0TqDVzSWR7bpFZKI9_07fKUAmQNSV_no9iAgYRLuPrnnsW1gQgCV-nNqzbcCOpzkHdCqro6nPSATq5Od3Einfc683gm5VGWxIldM0aBPytOymNz7PIZ6wkgcMABMe5Vw46B54ftW-TN5YZPDmCJ_kt7Mturn0OeQr9KJCu7S0I-SN14mL9KtGE1XDnIeR-C_YZhSA3vX4923v1l3vNFsKasqy9iEPHKM0hcogABAQCGAAECBAUGhAMJCgtYUnsiY2hhbGxlbmdlIjoiNGd2OFJyaERPdi1OSHByYlZNQlM1IiwiZG9tYWluIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9wbGF5Z3JvdW5kLmFscGhhLmNoYXBpLmlvIn0"
 }
  }
}

The verifiable presentation above includes a verifiable credential that contains an unlinkable subset of the information from the previous example and a derived proof that the verifier can use to verify that the information originated from the expected issuer and is bound to this particular exchange of information.

5.8 Representing Time

Implementers are urged to understand that representing and processing time values is not as straight-forward as it might seem and have a variety of idiosyncrasies that are not immediately obvious nor uniformly observed in different regions of the world. For example:

Calendaring systems other than the Gregorian calendar are actively used by various regions.

When processing Daylight Saving/Summer Time, it is important to understand that

it is not observed in all regions, 2) it does not necessarily begin or end on the same day or at the same time of day, and 3) the amount or direction of the adjustment does not always match other similar regions.
```
   -
```

Leap seconds might not be taken into account in all software systems, especially for dates and times that precede the introduction of the leap second. Leap seconds can affect highly sensitive systems that depend on the exact millisecond offset from the epoch. However, note that for most applications the only moment in time that is affected is the one second period of the leap second itself. That is, the moment after the most recent leap second can always be represented as the first moment of the next day (for example, 2023-01-01T00:00:00Z), regardless of whether the system in question understands leap seconds.

These are just a few examples that illustrate that the actual time of day, as would be seen on a clock on the wall, can exist in one region but not exist in another region. For this reason, implementers are urged to use time values that are more universal, such as values anchored to the Z time zone over values that are affected by Daylight Saving/Summer Time.

This specification attempts to increase the number of universally recognized combinations of dates and times, and reduce the potential for misinterpretation of time values, by using the dateTimeStamp construction first established by the [XMLSCHEMA11-2] specification. In order to reduce misinterpretations between different time zones, all time values expressed in conforming documents SHOULD be specified in dateTimeStamp format, either in Universal Coordinated Time (UTC), denoted by a Z at the end of the value, or with a time zone offset relative to UTC. Time values that are incorrectly serialized without an offset MUST be interpreted as UTC. Examples of valid time zone offsets relative to UTC include Z, +01:00, -08:00, and +14:00. See the regular expression at the end of this section for a formal definition of all acceptable values.

Time zone definitions are occasionally changed by their governing body. When replacing or issuing new verifiable credentials, implementers are advised to ensure that changes to local time zone rules do not result in unexpected gaps in validity. For example, consider the zone America/Los_Angeles, which has a raw offset of UTC-8 and had voted to stop observing daylight savings time in the year 2024. A given verifiable credential that had a validUtil value of 2024-07-12T12:00:00-07:00, might be re-issued to have a validFrom value of 2024-07-12T12:00:00-08:00, which would create a gap of an hour where the verifiable credential would not be valid.

Implementers that desire to check dateTimeStamp values for validity can use the regular expression provided below, which is reproduced from the [XMLSCHEMA11-2] specification for convenience. To avoid doubt, the regular expression in [XMLSCHEMA11-2] is the normative definition. Implementers are advised that not all dateTimeStamp values that pass the regular expression below are valid moments in time. For example, the regular expression below allows for 31 days in every month, which allows for leap years, and leap seconds, as well as days in places where they do not exist. That said, modern system libraries that generate dateTimeStamp values are often error-free in their generation of valid dateTimeStamp values. The regular expression shown below (minus the whitespace included here for readability), is often adequate when processing library-generated dates and times on modern systems.

[Example 32](https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model-2.0/#example-regular-expression-to-detect-a-valid-xml-schema-1-1-part-2-datetimestamp): Regular expression to detect a valid XML Schema 1.1: Part 2 dateTimeStamp

-?([1-9][0-9]{3,}|0[0-9]{3})
-(0[1-9]|1[0-2])
-(0[1-9]|[12][0-9]|3[01])
T(([01][0-9]|2[0-3]):[0-5][0-9]:[0-5][0-9](\.[0-9]+)?|(24:00:00(\.0+)?))
(Z|(\+|-)((0[0-9]|1[0-3]):[0-5][0-9]|14:00))

5.9 AuthorizationThis section is non-normative.

Verifiable credentials are intended as a means of reliably identifying subjects. While it is recognized that Role Based Access Controls (RBACs) and Attribute Based Access Controls (ABACs) rely on this identification as a means of authorizing subjects to access resources, this specification does not provide a complete solution for RBAC or ABAC. Authorization is not an appropriate use for this specification without an accompanying authorization framework.

The Working Group did consider authorization use cases during the creation of this specification and is pursuing that work as an architectural layer built on top of this specification.

5.10 Reserved Extension Points

This specification reserves a number of properties to serve as possible extension points. While some implementers signaled interest in these properties, their inclusion in this specification was considered to be premature. It is important to note that none of these properties are defined by this specification. Consequently, implementers are cautioned that use of these properties is considered experimental.

Implementers MAY use these properties, but SHOULD expect them and/or their meanings to change during the process of normatively specifying them. Implementers SHOULD NOT use these properties without a publicly disclosed specification describing their implementation.

In order to avoid collisions regarding how the following properties are used, implementations MUST specify a type property in the value associated with the reserved property. For more information related to adding type information, see Section 4.5 Types.

          Reserved Property
          Description
        
      

      
        
          `confidenceMethod`

A property used for specifying one or more methods that a verifier might use to increase their confidence that the value of a property in or of a verifiable credential or verifiable presentation is accurate. The associated vocabulary URL MUST be https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials#confidenceMethod.

          `renderMethod`

A property used for specifying one or more methods to render a credential into a visual, auditory, haptic, or other format. The associated vocabulary URL MUST be https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials#renderMethod.

An unofficial list of specifications that are associated with the extension points defined in this specification, as well as the reserved extension points defined in this section, can be found in the Verifiable Credential Extensions. Items in the directory that refer to reserved extension points SHOULD be treated as experimental.