attack-ent-t1547-013-xdg-autostart-entries

name: attack-ent-t1547-013-xdg-autostart-entries description: "Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1547.013 XDG Autostart Entries in the enterprise matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1547.013, XDG Autostart Entries, or enterprise ATT&CK. Adversaries may add or modify XDG Autostart Entries to execute malicious programs or commands when a user’s desktop environment is loaded at login." license: MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See https://attack.mitre.org/resources/terms-of-use/ metadata: source: mitre-attack/attack-stix-data domain: enterprise attack_id: T1547.013 attack_stix_id: attack-pattern--e0232cb0-ded5-4c2e-9dc7-2893142a5c11 attack_version: "1.2" attack_modified: "2025-10-24T17:49:30.252Z"

MITRE ATT&CK T1547.013: XDG Autostart Entries

When to use this skill

Use this skill when the task involves T1547.013, XDG Autostart Entries, enterprise ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK sub-technique.

Technique context

• ATT&CK domain: enterprise
• ATT&CK ID: T1547.013
• Technique name: XDG Autostart Entries
• Type: sub-technique
• ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/013
• Tactics: persistence, privilege-escalation
• Platforms: Linux
• Required permissions: Not specified
• Effective permissions: Not specified
• Defenses bypassed: Not specified

ATT&CK description

Adversaries may add or modify XDG Autostart Entries to execute malicious programs or commands when a user’s desktop environment is loaded at login. XDG Autostart entries are available for any XDG-compliant Linux system. XDG Autostart entries use Desktop Entry files (.desktop) to configure the user’s desktop environment upon user login. These configuration files determine what applications launch upon user login, define associated applications to open specific file types, and define applications used to open removable media.(Citation: Free Desktop Application Autostart Feb 2006)(Citation: Free Desktop Entry Keys)

Adversaries may abuse this feature to establish persistence by adding a path to a malicious binary or command to the Exec directive in the .desktop configuration file. When the user’s desktop environment is loaded at user login, the .desktop files located in the XDG Autostart directories are automatically executed. System-wide Autostart entries are located in the /etc/xdg/autostart directory while the user entries are located in the ~/.config/autostart directory.

Adversaries may combine this technique with Masquerading to blend malicious Autostart entries with legitimate programs.(Citation: Red Canary Netwire Linux 2022)

Agent workflow

1. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
2. Load bundled resources as needed: use references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
3. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
4. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
5. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
6. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.

Bundled resources

• references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
• references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
• references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
• templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
• templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
• templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
• templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
• scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
• assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.

To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.

Detection guidance

No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.

Useful telemetry and data sources

• Not specified in the STIX object.

Mitigations to consider

• Limit Software Installation
• Restrict File and Directory Permissions
• User Account Management

Known threat context

Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:

• Contagious Interview (intrusion-set)
• CrossRAT (malware)
• Fysbis (malware)
• InvisibleFerret (malware)
• NETWIRE (malware)
• Pupy (tool)
• RotaJakiro (malware)

Recommended output pattern

When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:

• Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
• Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
• Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
• Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
• Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
• References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.

ATT&CK contributors

• Tony Lambert, Red Canary