recon-reporting

name: recon-reporting description: "Recon output formatting — report structure, CVSS v4.0 scoring (primary), MITRE ATT&CK mapping, finding prioritization, Markdown output, detection gap tracking, handoff checklists." allowed-tools: Read Write metadata: subdomain: reporting kind: reporting when_to_use: "generate report, write report, summarize findings, CVSS score, prioritize findings, recon report, final report, handoff" tags: report, cvss, findings, mitre-mapping, handoff, detection-gap, purple-team mitre_attack:

Reconnaissance Reporting Knowledge Base

Effective reconnaissance is only as valuable as the intelligence it communicates. This skill defines how to structure, prioritize, and present findings for actionable handoff to the next engagement phase.

All agent-authored documents MUST be Markdown format (.md). Scan output files (.txt, .xml) are operational data and are not documents.

1. Report Structure

Every recon engagement produces a structured report with these sections:

Executive Summary

A 2-3 sentence overview of what was found, the overall attack surface size, and the most critical findings.

Target Overview

2. Finding Document Template

Each significant verified finding gets its own Markdown file in findings/ named by canonical ID: findings/FIND-{NNN}.md. Do not create placeholder finding files. Use this template:

---
id: FIND-001
severity: CRITICAL
cvss_score: 9.3
cvss_vector: "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
cwe: CWE-306
mitre: T1595.001
affected_target: api.example.com:3306
confidence: confirmed
objective_id: OBJ-REC-006
phase: recon
agent: recon-agent-run-42
detected: false
remediation_priority: immediate
discovered_at: 2026-04-06T14:30:00Z
---

# [CRITICAL] Exposed MySQL Database on api.example.com:3306 allows Unauthenticated Access

## Description

MySQL 5.7.42 is accessible from the internet on `api.example.com:3306` without network-level access controls. Any party that can reach this host can attempt authentication directly against the database engine.

## Steps to Reproduce

1. From an external IP, run:
   ```
   nmap -sV -p 3306 api.example.com
   ```
2. Observe that port 3306 is open and the MySQL 5.7.42 banner is returned.
3. Attempt connection with no credentials:
   ```
   mysql -h api.example.com -u root
   ```
4. Observe whether login succeeds or fails with an authentication error (both indicate the port is reachable).

## Impact

Direct internet exposure of the MySQL port enables brute-force, credential stuffing, and exploitation of any MySQL CVE applicable to version 5.7.42. Successful authentication yields full database read/write access to application data.

## Evidence

| Type | Path | Description |
|------|------|-------------|
| Scan output | findings/evidence/FIND-001_nmap.txt | nmap -sV -p 3306 full output |
| Screenshot | findings/evidence/FIND-001_mysql_banner.txt | Raw MySQL banner response |

## Detection Gap Analysis

| Control | Fired? | Notes |
|---------|--------|-------|
| Firewall / ACL | No | Port 3306 reachable from external IP |
| SIEM alert | Unknown | No alert observed during scan window |
| IDS/IPS | No | Scan completed without interruption |
| WAF | N/A | Not applicable to TCP/MySQL traffic |

Blue team detection status: **Not detected**. The reconnaissance activity produced no observable defensive response.

## Remediation

1. Add a firewall rule to block inbound TCP 3306 from all sources except application servers.
2. Upgrade MySQL to the latest 8.x release (5.7 is EOL).
3. Audit MySQL user accounts and remove anonymous/root remote logins.
4. Enable MySQL audit logging.

## References

- CVE database for MySQL 5.7: https://www.cvedetails.com/product/3300/
- CIS MySQL Benchmark: https://www.cisecurity.org/benchmark/mysql
- MITRE ATT&CK T1595.001: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/001/

3. Finding Categories

A. Domain & Subdomain Inventory

| Subdomain | IP Address | Status | Notes |
|-----------|-----------|--------|-------|
| www.example.com | 93.184.216.34 | Active | Main site, Cloudflare CDN |
| api.example.com | 10.0.1.50 | Active | REST API, no WAF detected |
| dev.example.com | 10.0.1.51 | Active | Development server, potential target |
| old.example.com | — | NXDOMAIN | Decommissioned |
| staging.example.com | CNAME → *.herokuapp.com | Dangling | Subdomain takeover candidate |

B. DNS & Infrastructure Map

| Record Type | Value | Analysis |
|-------------|-------|----------|
| A | 93.184.216.34 | Primary web server |
| MX | aspmx.l.google.com (pri 10) | Google Workspace email |
| NS | ns1.cloudflare.com | Cloudflare DNS hosting |
| TXT (SPF) | v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all | Soft fail SPF |
| TXT (DMARC) | v=DMARC1; p=none | DMARC not enforced |
| CAA | 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" | Only Let's Encrypt can issue certs |

C. Open Ports & Services

| IP | Port | Protocol | Service | Version | Risk Notes |
|----|------|----------|---------|---------|------------|
| 10.0.1.50 | 22 | TCP | SSH | OpenSSH 8.9p1 | Current version |
| 10.0.1.50 | 80 | TCP | HTTP | nginx 1.18.0 | Outdated (CVE potential) |
| 10.0.1.50 | 443 | TCP | HTTPS | nginx 1.18.0 | TLS 1.2, missing HSTS |
| 10.0.1.50 | 3306 | TCP | MySQL | 5.7.42 | Exposed database port |
| 10.0.1.51 | 8080 | TCP | HTTP | Apache Tomcat 9.0.65 | Dev server, default page |

D. Technology Stack

| Layer | Technology | Evidence |
|-------|-----------|----------|
| CDN | Cloudflare | CF-RAY header, NS records |
| Web Server | nginx 1.18.0 | Server header |
| Backend | PHP 8.1 | X-Powered-By header |
| CMS | WordPress 6.x | /wp-content/ paths |
| Database | MySQL 5.7 | Port 3306 open, banner |
| Email | Google Workspace | MX records |
| DNS | Cloudflare | NS records |

E. Vulnerability Scan Results

| Source | Target | Finding | Severity | Template/CVE |
|--------|--------|---------|----------|--------------|
| nuclei | api.example.com | Exposed .env file | CRITICAL | exposure-env |
| nuclei | dev.example.com | Git config disclosure | HIGH | git-config |
| nikto | www.example.com | X-Frame-Options missing | MEDIUM | — |
| nmap | 10.0.1.50:443 | TLS 1.0 supported | MEDIUM | ssl-enum-ciphers |

4. CVSS Scoring

CVSS 4.0 (Primary)

CVSS 4.0 is the primary scoring system for all findings. Use CVSS 3.1 only for dual-reporting when client systems require it.

Score Ranges

CVSS 4.0 Metric Groups

Base (BTE — required):

• AV Attack Vector: N (Network) / A (Adjacent) / L (Local) / P (Physical)
• AC Attack Complexity: L (Low) / H (High)
• AT Attack Requirements: N (None) / P (Present) — replaces Scope concept
• PR Privileges Required: N / L / H
• UI User Interaction: N (None) / P (Passive) / A (Active)
• VC/VI/VA Vulnerable System: Confidentiality / Integrity / Availability — N/L/H
• SC/SI/SA Subsequent System: Confidentiality / Integrity / Availability — N/L/H

Threat (T — optional, adjusts exploitability):

• E Exploit Maturity: X (Not Defined) / A (Attacked) / P (POC) / U (Unreported)

Environmental (E — optional, adjusts for deployment context):

• CR/IR/AR Confidentiality/Integrity/Availability Requirements
• MAV/MAC/MAT/MPR/MUI Modified Base metrics

Supplemental (S — informational only, no score impact):

• AU Automatable: Y/N — can the attack be scripted at scale?
• R Recovery: A (Automatic) / U (User) / I (Irrecoverable)
• V Value Density: D (Diffuse) / C (Concentrated)
• RE Response Effort: L (Low) / M (Moderate) / H (High)
• U Provider Urgency: Clear / Green / Amber / Red

Common Recon Finding CVSS 4.0 Scores

Dual Reporting (when client requires CVSS 3.1 as well)

Include both scores in the finding frontmatter and the body:

- **CVSS 4.0**: 9.3 (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N)
- **CVSS 3.1**: 9.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)

Set cvss_vector in the YAML frontmatter to the CVSS 4.0 vector. Add cvss_v31_score and cvss_v31_vector as additional frontmatter fields if dual-reporting.

5. Evidence Management

Storage Layout

Raw scan evidence is stored separately from finding documents:

findings/
├── FIND-001.md                       # Finding document (Markdown; id in frontmatter)
├── FIND-002.md
└── evidence/
    ├── FIND-001_nmap.txt              # Raw nmap output
    ├── FIND-001_mysql_banner.txt      # Raw banner grab
    ├── FIND-002_nuclei.txt            # Raw nuclei output
    └── FIND-002_curl_env.txt          # Raw HTTP response
recon/
├── recon_<target>_passive.txt
├── recon_<target>_subdomains.txt
├── httpx_<target>.txt
├── nmap_<target>_<scan_type>.txt
├── nmap_<target>_<scan_type>.xml
├── ffuf_<target>.txt
└── nuclei_<target>.txt

Evidence File Rules

• Evidence files in findings/evidence/ are plain text dumps of tool output, not Markdown.
• Name format: FIND-{NNN}_{tool}.txt where {tool} is the tool that produced the output (e.g., nmap, nuclei, curl, httpx).
• Multiple evidence files per finding are allowed; add one row per file to the Evidence table in the finding document.
• Do not truncate evidence files — preserve full raw output for re-analysis.

Evidence Table Format

In the finding document, list evidence as a table:

## Evidence

| Type | Path | Description |
|------|------|-------------|
| Scan output | findings/evidence/FIND-001_nmap.txt | nmap -sV -p 3306 full output |
| Banner grab | findings/evidence/FIND-001_mysql_banner.txt | Raw MySQL server banner |

6. Detection Gap Analysis (Purple Team / TIBER-EU)

Every finding document MUST include a Detection Gap Analysis section. This is a core red team deliverable that distinguishes operational red teaming from standard penetration testing.

Purpose

Record whether the blue team (SOC/SIEM/IDS) detected the reconnaissance activity that led to this finding. This data feeds:

• TIBER-EU and CBEST purple team exercises
• SOC maturity assessments
• Control gap remediation roadmaps

Detection Gap Table

## Detection Gap Analysis

| Control | Fired? | Notes |
|---------|--------|-------|
| Firewall / ACL | No | Port 3306 reachable from external IP |
| SIEM alert | Unknown | No alert observed during scan window |
| IDS/IPS | No | Scan completed without interruption |
| WAF | N/A | Not applicable to TCP/MySQL traffic |
| EDR on host | Unknown | No endpoint visibility from external position |

• Fired? values: Yes, No, Unknown, N/A
• Use Unknown when detection cannot be confirmed or denied from the attacker position
• Use N/A when the control is not applicable to the attack vector

Detection Status Line

After the table, state the overall detection outcome explicitly:

Blue team detection status: **Not detected**. The reconnaissance activity produced no observable defensive response during the scan window (2026-04-06T14:00–14:45Z).

Or if detected:

Blue team detection status: **Detected**. SIEM alert fired at 14:22Z, approximately 8 minutes after scanning began. Scanning was not interrupted, indicating detection-without-response gap.

7. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Reconnaissance Tactics (TA0043)

Use the mitre field in finding frontmatter for the primary technique. List secondary techniques in the References section of the finding document.

8. Finding Prioritization

Priority Levels

Prioritized Findings List Format

The consolidated report's findings section groups by priority:

## Critical Findings

### FIND-001 — [CRITICAL] Exposed MySQL on api.example.com:3306
- **CVSS 4.0**: 9.3 (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N)
- **MITRE ATT&CK**: T1595.001
- **Evidence**: nmap -sV confirms MySQL 5.7.42 open from internet
- **Risk**: Unauthenticated database access
- **Recommendation**: Firewall TCP 3306, upgrade MySQL to 8.x
- **Full finding**: [findings/FIND-001.md](findings/FIND-001.md)

## High Findings

### FIND-002 — [HIGH] Dangling CNAME — staging.example.com
- **CVSS 4.0**: 8.7 (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N)
- **MITRE ATT&CK**: T1596.001
- **Evidence**: CNAME points to deprovisioned Heroku app
- **Risk**: Subdomain takeover enables phishing and cookie theft
- **Recommendation**: Remove DNS record or reclaim the Heroku app
- **Full finding**: [findings/FIND-002.md](findings/FIND-002.md)

9. Attack Chain Analysis

Identifying Exploit Chains

Individual findings combine into attack chains. Document these explicitly — they represent real-world risk better than isolated scores.

## Attack Chain: Unauthenticated Database Access

**Chain**: Subdomain discovery → Exposed MySQL → Credential extraction
**Combined Risk**: CRITICAL

1. Passive recon discovered `db.example.com` via CT logs (T1596.003)
2. Active scan confirmed MySQL 5.7.42 on port 3306, internet-facing (T1595.001)
3. No authentication required for `root` user (empty password)
4. Database contains PII for ~50,000 users

**Impact**: Full database compromise without any credentials
**Remediation**: Firewall MySQL port, set root password, audit access logs
**Detection gap**: Neither step 1 nor step 2 triggered a SOC alert

Chain Severity Escalation

10. File Management

Directory Layout

/workspace/
├── plan/
│   ├── roe.json                          # Rules of Engagement (read-only)
│   ├── conops.json                       # Threat actor profile
│   └── opplan.json                       # Objectives tracker
├── timeline.jsonl                         # Append-only activity/finding timeline
├── recon/
│   └── report_<target>.md                # Consolidated recon report
├── findings/
│   ├── FIND-001.md                       # Individual finding (Markdown; id in frontmatter)
│   ├── FIND-002.md
│   └── evidence/
│       ├── FIND-001_nmap.txt              # Raw scan output (plain text)
│       └── FIND-002_nuclei.txt
└── recon/
    ├── recon_<target>_passive.txt
    ├── recon_<target>_subdomains.txt
    ├── httpx_<target>.txt
    ├── nmap_<target>_<scan_type>.txt
    ├── nmap_<target>_<scan_type>.xml
    ├── ffuf_<target>.txt
    └── nuclei_<target>.txt

Naming and Persistence Rules

• Finding documents: findings/FIND-{NNN}.md (e.g., findings/FIND-001.md)
• The file name and id field in YAML frontmatter (FIND-001, FIND-002, ...) are the canonical cross-reference
• Evidence artifacts: findings/evidence/FIND-{NNN}_{tool}.txt (keyed by finding ID)
• Raw scan data: recon/ directory, named by tool and target
• Always save scan output with -oN (nmap), -o (subfinder/nuclei/httpx), or output flags (ffuf)
• Keep raw data — the final report synthesizes, but raw data enables re-analysis

11. OPPLAN Feedback Loop

After generating the report, update plan/opplan.json to reflect actual findings.

Update Completed Objectives

For each recon objective:

• Set "status": "completed" for finished objectives
• Add an actual findings summary to a "results" field
• Note any objectives that were blocked or partially completed

Create Follow-Up Objectives

When the report reveals new targets or attack paths not in the original OPPLAN:

1. Create new objectives following the OBJ-{PHASE}-{NUMBER} convention
2. Assign priorities based on finding severity (CRITICAL findings → highest priority)
3. Ensure new objectives have scope check, OPSEC check, and output persistence criteria
4. Use opplan-converter skill's references/objective-rules.md for validation

Report → OPPLAN Mapping

| Report Finding | Completed Objective | New Objective (if authorized) |
|----------------|--------------------|-----------------------------|
| FIND-001: Exposed MySQL (CRITICAL, CVSS 9.3) | OBJ-REC-006 (port scan) | OBJ-EXP-001 (test MySQL default credentials) |
| FIND-002: Dangling CNAME (HIGH, CVSS 8.7) | OBJ-REC-003 (subdomain enum) | OBJ-EXP-002 (attempt subdomain takeover) |

12. Handoff Checklist

Before concluding reconnaissance and handing off to the exploitation phase:

• All subdomains enumerated and resolved
• DNS infrastructure fully mapped
• All in-scope IPs port-scanned with service versions
• Technology stack identified for key assets
• Vulnerability scan (nuclei) run on all live web targets
• Each significant finding has a findings/FIND-{NNN}.md document
• All findings scored with CVSS 4.0 (v3.1 added if dual-reporting required)
• Findings mapped to MITRE ATT&CK techniques
• Detection gap analysis completed for each finding
• Findings prioritized by exploitability and chained risk
• Raw evidence saved to findings/evidence/ with correct naming
• Raw scan data preserved in recon/ directory
• Attack chains documented in consolidated report
• Consolidated recon report saved to recon/report_<target>.md
• opplan.json updated with completed objectives and findings
• New follow-up objectives created for next phase (if authorized)