By name: kill-chain-analysis description: "Kill chain analysis and attack path decision-making — findings analysis, attack vector selection, target prioritization, phase transitions." allowed-tools: Read metadata: subdomain: orchestration kind: analytic when_to_use: "analyze findings, select attack vector, prioritize targets, which technique, attack path, next attack, choose approach, alternative vector, blocked what next" tags: kill-chain, decision-making, attack-path, target-prioritization, technique-selection upstream_ref: "Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain + Decepticon attack-path planner — analytic decision support, no direct attack technique"
Kill Chain Analysis & Attack Path Decision-Making
Decision Framework
When selecting the next action, evaluate in order:
- What does the OPPLAN say? — Prioritized objectives drive decisions
- What do findings tell us? — Previous phase results constrain options
- What's the risk/reward? — Lower noise approaches first
- What's the OPSEC impact? — Consult
opsecskill before noisy actions
Findings Analysis
After Recon Phase — Selecting Attack Vectors
Read recon/ outputs and categorize:
| Finding Type | Indicates | Next Action |
|---|---|---|
| Web apps with known CVEs | Web exploitation path | exploit → web techniques |
| AD services (88/389/636) | AD attack surface | exploit → AD techniques (after initial access) |
| Exposed credentials (OSINT) | Credential-based access | exploit → credential stuffing/spray |
| Cloud misconfigs (S3/blob) | Cloud attack path | exploit → cloud-specific techniques |
| VPN/remote access services | Network perimeter entry | exploit → VPN/RDP exploitation |
| Employee emails + breach data | Social engineering path | exploit → phishing (if in scope) |
Attack Vector Prioritization
Rank available vectors by:
Score = (Success Probability × Impact) / Detection Risk
1. Valid credentials from OSINT → High prob, High impact, Low noise
2. Known web CVE (public exploit) → High prob, Med impact, Med noise
3. AD misconfiguration (no patch) → Med prob, High impact, Med noise
4. Password spray against O365 → Med prob, High impact, High noise
5. Zero-day or custom exploit → Low prob, High impact, Low noise
Always prefer: credentials > misconfigurations > known CVEs > brute force
After Exploitation — Deciding Post-Exploit Strategy
Once a foothold is established, analyze:
| Context | Decision |
|---|---|
| Low-privilege user on workstation | Prioritize: privesc → cred dump → lateral to server |
| Service account on server | Prioritize: cred dump (may have cached admin creds) → lateral |
| Domain user credentials | Prioritize: AD enumeration → Kerberoasting → DCSync path |
| Local admin on single host | Prioritize: cred dump → check for cached domain creds → lateral |
| Already domain admin | Prioritize: objective completion → evidence collection → reporting |
Handling Blocked Objectives
Failure Analysis Decision Tree
Objective BLOCKED
│
├── WHY did it fail?
│ ├── Defense mechanism (WAF/EDR/IDS)
│ │ → Consult defense-evasion skill → retry with evasion
│ │
│ ├── Missing prerequisite (need creds/access/info)
│ │ → Identify which prior phase provides it → re-order objectives
│ │
│ ├── Target hardened / not vulnerable
│ │ → Check findings for alternative target → redirect attack
│ │
│ └── Tool failure / environment issue
│ → Retry with different tool or approach
│
├── Is there an ALTERNATIVE path?
│ ├── YES → Craft new delegation with adjusted approach
│ └── NO → Mark BLOCKED, document reason, proceed to next objective
│
└── Should we REVISIT later?
├── YES (new intel may help) → Keep status BLOCKED, note in lessons_learned.md
└── NO (dead end) → Mark BLOCKED permanently
Common Pivots
| Original Approach | Alternative When Blocked |
|---|---|
| SQLi on web app | SSTI, deserialization, SSRF, or move to different web app |
| Kerberoasting | AS-REP roasting, ADCS abuse, password spray |
| LSASS dump blocked by EDR | nanodump, comsvcs.dll, MiniDumpWriteDump via syscall |
| WinRM blocked | PsExec, WMI, DCOM, RDP, SMB exec |
| Password spray lockout | Low-and-slow spray, single-password-multiple-users |
MITRE ATT&CK Phase Mapping
Use this to map OPPLAN objective phases to ATT&CK tactics:
| OPPLAN Phase | ATT&CK Tactic | Sub-Agent |
|---|---|---|
| Recon | TA0043 Reconnaissance | recon |
| Initial Access | TA0001 Initial Access | exploit |
| Execution | TA0002 Execution | exploit |
| Persistence | TA0003 Persistence | postexploit |
| Privilege Escalation | TA0004 Privilege Escalation | postexploit |
| Defense Evasion | TA0005 Defense Evasion | exploit / postexploit |
| Credential Access | TA0006 Credential Access | postexploit |
| Discovery | TA0007 Discovery | recon / postexploit |
| Lateral Movement | TA0008 Lateral Movement | postexploit |
| Collection | TA0009 Collection | postexploit |
| Exfiltration | TA0010 Exfiltration | postexploit |
Target Prioritization
When multiple targets are available, prioritize:
- Crown jewels — Targets explicitly named in OPPLAN objectives
- Domain controllers — Access = domain-wide compromise
- File servers — Likely contain sensitive data for objectives
- Admin workstations — Cached credentials for further access
- Application servers — May contain database credentials, API keys
- Standard workstations — Lower value, but may provide stepping stones