analyzing-active-directory-acl-abuse - SKILL.md Agent Skill

name: analyzing-active-directory-acl-abuse description: Detect dangerous ACL misconfigurations in Active Directory using ldap3 to identify GenericAll, WriteDACL, and WriteOwner abuse paths domain: cybersecurity subdomain: identity-security tags:

active-directory
acl-abuse
ldap
privilege-escalation version: '1.0' author: mahipal license: Apache-2.0 nist_csf:
PR.AA-01
PR.AA-05
PR.AA-06

Analyzing Active Directory ACL Abuse

Overview

Active Directory Access Control Lists (ACLs) define permissions on AD objects through Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs) containing Access Control Entries (ACEs). Misconfigured ACEs can grant non-privileged users dangerous permissions such as GenericAll (full control), WriteDACL (modify permissions), WriteOwner (take ownership), and GenericWrite (modify attributes) on sensitive objects like Domain Admins groups, domain controllers, or GPOs.

This skill uses the ldap3 Python library to connect to a Domain Controller, query objects with their nTSecurityDescriptor attribute, parse the binary security descriptor into SDDL (Security Descriptor Definition Language) format, and identify ACEs that grant dangerous permissions to non-administrative principals. These misconfigurations are the basis for ACL-based attack paths discovered by tools like BloodHound.

When to Use

When investigating security incidents that require analyzing active directory acl abuse
When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques

Prerequisites

Python 3.9 or later with ldap3 library (pip install ldap3)
Domain user credentials with read access to AD objects
Network connectivity to Domain Controller on port 389 (LDAP) or 636 (LDAPS)
Understanding of Active Directory security model and SDDL format

Steps

Connect to Domain Controller: Establish an LDAP connection using ldap3 with NTLM or simple authentication. Use LDAPS (port 636) for encrypted connections in production.
Query target objects: Search the target OU or entire domain for objects including users, groups, computers, and OUs. Request the nTSecurityDescriptor, distinguishedName, objectClass, and sAMAccountName attributes.
Parse security descriptors: Convert the binary nTSecurityDescriptor into its SDDL string representation. Parse each ACE in the DACL to extract the trustee SID, access mask, and ACE type (allow/deny).
Resolve SIDs to principals: Map security identifiers (SIDs) to human-readable account names using LDAP lookups against the domain. Identify well-known SIDs for built-in groups.
Check for dangerous permissions: Compare each ACE's access mask against dangerous permission bitmasks: GenericAll (0x10000000), WriteDACL (0x00040000), WriteOwner (0x00080000), GenericWrite (0x40000000), and WriteProperty for specific extended rights.
Filter non-admin trustees: Exclude expected administrative trustees (Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, SYSTEM, Administrators) and flag ACEs where non-privileged users or groups hold dangerous permissions.
Map attack paths: For each finding, document the potential attack chain (e.g., GenericAll on user allows password reset, WriteDACL on group allows adding self to group).
Generate remediation report: Output a JSON report with all dangerous ACEs, affected objects, non-admin trustees, and recommended remediation steps.

Expected Output

{
  "domain": "corp.example.com",
  "objects_scanned": 1247,
  "dangerous_aces_found": 8,
  "findings": [
    {
      "severity": "critical",
      "target_object": "CN=Domain Admins,CN=Users,DC=corp,DC=example,DC=com",
      "target_type": "group",
      "trustee": "CORP\\helpdesk-team",
      "permission": "GenericAll",
      "access_mask": "0x10000000",
      "ace_type": "ACCESS_ALLOWED",
      "attack_path": "GenericAll on Domain Admins group allows adding arbitrary members",
      "remediation": "Remove GenericAll ACE for helpdesk-team on Domain Admins"
    }
  ]
}

When NOT to Use

You need to perform the attack, not analyze it (use performing-* skills)
Task is about detection, not analysis (use detecting-* skills)
You need to implement controls (use implementing-* skills)
Task is about threat hunting, not post-incident analysis (use hunting-* skills)
You don't have access to the artifacts/logs to analyze
Task requires real-time monitoring (use SOC tools)

Red Flags

Performing actions without explicit written authorization from the asset owner
Testing against production systems without a defined scope and rules of engagement
Sharing sensitive findings or credentials in unencrypted communications
Failing to properly scope and contain the assessment before starting

Verification

All steps executed successfully against a test environment before production use
Output documented with screenshots or logs demonstrating expected behavior
Results validated against known-good baselines or reference implementations
Documentation complete enough for another analyst to reproduce findings