name: threat-model:lvms description: Analyze a PR for LVMS (LVM Storage) security threats with STRIDE/DFD analysis, MITRE ATT&CK and OWASP mapping disable-model-invocation: true allowed-tools: Read, Grep, Glob, Write, Edit, Bash, WebFetch argument-hint: "<PR-number | GitHub-URL | repo PR-number>"
LVMS PR Threat Analysis
Analyze a pull request for security threats against the LVMS (LVM Storage) operator, map to MITRE ATT&CK, and generate a formal report.
Note: The LVMS DFD model (
dfd-elements-lvms.md) is not yet defined. This skill will perform general security analysis, ShellCheck scanning, and MITRE/OWASP mapping. DFD element mapping and STRIDE cross-referencing will be available once the DFD model is created.
Reference Files
Bundled with this skill:
dfd-elements-lvms.md— LVMS DFD element catalog (placeholder — not yet modeled)
Shared references (in $PLUGIN_DIR/references/):
mitre-reference.md— MITRE ATT&CK lookup with DFD element mappingsowasp-reference.md— OWASP Top 10:2025 mapping with DFD element cross-referencesmitre-findings-template.md— Template for cumulative findings tracker
Discovered at runtime from the workspace:
$THREAT_MODEL_DIR/LVMS-THREAT-MODEL.md— LVMS formal threat model (when available)$FINDINGS_FILE— LVMS findings tracker (created from template on first use)
Workspace Discovery
Before starting analysis, discover the workspace layout.
Discovery Steps
Find workspace root: Walk upward from
$PWDuntil a directory containingrepos/is found. If no parent qualifies, fall back to checking whether the current git repo sits inside arepos/directory:d="$PWD" while [ "$d" != "/" ]; do if [ -d "$d/repos" ]; then echo "$d" break fi d="$(dirname "$d")" done if [ "$d" = "/" ]; then repo_root="$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel 2>/dev/null || true)" if [ -n "$repo_root" ] && [ "$(basename "$(dirname "$repo_root")")" = "repos" ]; then echo "$(dirname "$(dirname "$repo_root")")" fi fiSet workspace paths: Once the workspace root (
WORKSPACE) is found:- Repos directory:
$WORKSPACE/repos/ - Threat model: Look for
LVMS-THREAT-MODEL.mdin:$WORKSPACE/repos/lvm-operator/docs/$WORKSPACE/docs/- The current directory
- Report output: If
$REPORT_DIRis already set in the environment, use it directly. Otherwise, write reports to the same directory where the threat model is found. If not found, write to$WORKSPACE/reports/(create if needed). - Findings tracker:
$WORKSPACE/.claude/skills/threat-model/mitre-findings-lvms.md— initialized from$PLUGIN_DIR/references/mitre-findings-template.mdon first use.
- Repos directory:
Validate workspace: Warn the user if:
- No
repos/directory is found - Required repos for the target PR are not cloned locally
- DFD model is not yet defined (analysis proceeds without DFD mapping)
- No
Path Variables Reference
| Variable | Description | Example |
|---|---|---|
$WORKSPACE |
Root directory containing repos/ |
/home/user/Projects/lvm-workspace |
$REPOS |
Repos directory | $WORKSPACE/repos |
$THREAT_MODEL_DIR |
Directory containing formal threat model | $REPOS/lvm-operator/docs |
$REPORT_DIR |
Directory for generated reports | Same as $THREAT_MODEL_DIR or $WORKSPACE/reports |
$FINDINGS_FILE |
LVMS findings tracker | $WORKSPACE/.claude/skills/threat-model/mitre-findings-lvms.md |
Findings File
Each threat-model skill writes to its own findings file (mitre-findings-tnf.md, mitre-findings-tna.md, mitre-findings-sno.md, mitre-findings-lvms.md), so no file locking is required during concurrent execution.
Append protocol (use in step 12):
FINDINGS_FILE="$WORKSPACE/.claude/skills/threat-model/mitre-findings-lvms.md"
mkdir -p "$(dirname "$FINDINGS_FILE")"
cp -n "RESOLVED_TEMPLATE_PATH" "$FINDINGS_FILE"
cat >> "$FINDINGS_FILE" <<'FINDINGS_BLOCK'
## LVMS — REPO PR #NUMBER (YYYY-MM-DD)
| Technique ID | Technique Name | Finding | Severity | Status | Notes |
|--------------|----------------|---------|----------|--------|-------|
| T#### | Name | VULN-# | Severity | Open | Description |
---
FINDINGS_BLOCK
Substitute RESOLVED_TEMPLATE_PATH with the absolute path to $PLUGIN_DIR/references/mitre-findings-template.md (resolved from this skill's directory). Fill in REPO, NUMBER, YYYY-MM-DD, and the table rows from the current analysis.
Input Formats
Option 1: PR Number Only
/threat-model:lvms 2271
Detects the repository from the current working directory.
Option 2: GitHub PR URL
/threat-model:lvms https://github.com/openshift/lvm-operator/pull/2271
Option 3: Explicit repo and PR
/threat-model:lvms lvm-operator 2271
Parsing Logic
If input is a URL (contains
github.com):- Extract org/repo/PR from:
https://github.com/<org>/<repo>/pull/<PR>
- Extract org/repo/PR from:
If input is a single number:
- Detect repo from current directory path
- Look for pattern
repos/<repo-name>/in the working directory
If input is
<repo> <number>:- Use provided repo name
- Look up org from the repository mapping table
Repository Mapping
| Repo | GitHub Org |
|---|---|
| lvm-operator | openshift |
| origin | openshift |
Instructions
- Discover workspace using the Workspace Discovery steps above
- Parse input to determine org, repo, and PR number
- Fetch PR details using
gh pr view <PR> --repo <org>/<repo>or WebFetch - Get changed files with
gh pr diff <PR> --repo <org>/<repo>or WebFetch - Run ShellCheck on any shell scripts in the changed files (see Automated Scanner section)
- Analyze all changes for security-relevant patterns (see Security Patterns)
- Map to DFD elements — if
dfd-elements-lvms.mdhas been populated, map changed files to affected DFD elements. If not yet modeled, skip and note in the report. - Apply per-element STRIDE to affected elements (if DFD is available) and cross-reference against
$THREAT_MODEL_DIR/LVMS-THREAT-MODEL.md(if found) - Combine findings from ShellCheck + AI analysis + DFD/STRIDE analysis
- Map findings to MITRE ATT&CK techniques (see
$PLUGIN_DIR/references/mitre-reference.md) - Generate report at
$REPORT_DIR/ - Append findings to tracker — follow the Append Protocol to write a findings block to
$FINDINGS_FILE
Automated Scanner: ShellCheck
ShellCheck is available in RHEL/Fedora repos (dnf install ShellCheck) - no external downloads required.
Installation Check
command -v shellcheck >/dev/null && echo "shellcheck: installed" || echo "shellcheck: NOT installed (run: dnf install ShellCheck)"
Running ShellCheck
shellcheck -f json <script-file>
shellcheck -S warning <script-file>
shellcheck -s bash <script-file>
Security-Relevant ShellCheck Codes
| Code | Severity | Security Relevance | MITRE |
|---|---|---|---|
| SC2086 | Warning | Unquoted variable - command injection risk | T1059 |
| SC2091 | Warning | Command in $() used as condition - injection | T1059 |
| SC2046 | Warning | Unquoted command substitution | T1059 |
| SC2012 | Info | Parsing ls output - can be exploited | T1059 |
| SC2029 | Warning | ssh command with unescaped variables | T1059 |
| SC2087 | Warning | Unquoted heredoc - variable expansion | T1059 |
| SC2155 | Warning | Declare/assign separately to avoid masking errors | - |
| SC2164 | Warning | cd without error-exit guard - path traversal risk | T1083 |
Optional External Scanners
| Tool | Source | Risks | Mitigations |
|---|---|---|---|
| Semgrep | pip/GitHub | Fetches rules from semgrep.dev; may send telemetry | Use --offline mode with local rules |
| Gitleaks | GitHub releases | Binary from external source | Verify checksums; use container image |
| gosec | GitHub/go install | Binary from external source | Verify checksums; audit source |
Security Patterns to Detect
| Category | Patterns | MITRE | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Command Injection | shell exec, os.system, subprocess, fmt.Sprintf with shell | T1059 | Critical |
| Credentials | hardcoded secrets, API keys, tokens, passwords in code | T1552 | Critical |
| Privilege Escalation | setuid, capabilities, privileged containers, sudo, nsenter | T1548 | High |
| Authentication | auth bypass, weak validation, token handling flaws | T1078 | High |
| Crypto Weakness | weak algorithms, hardcoded keys, disabled TLS verify | T1573 | High |
| Path Traversal | unsanitized file paths, symlink attacks | T1083 | Medium |
| Container Escape | host mounts, hostPID, hostNetwork, privileged mode | T1611 | Critical |
| Logging Exposure | sensitive data in logs, credential printing | T1005 | Medium |
| SSRF/Network | unvalidated URLs, exposed internal endpoints | T1046 | Medium |
| Deserialization | unsafe unmarshal, pickle, yaml.load | T1059 | High |
LVMS DFD Element Mapping
Not yet modeled. Once
dfd-elements-lvms.mdis populated with DFD elements, add code path mapping and trust boundary crossing tables here.
When the DFD is available, the analysis should follow the same STRIDE methodology as TNF/TNA:
- Map changed files to affected DFD elements
- Apply per-element STRIDE questions
- Cross-reference against
LVMS-THREAT-MODEL.md
Report Output
Use report templates from $PLUGIN_DIR/references/report-templates.md. Set <topology> to LVMS when filling in the templates.