remediate-azure-nsg-revoke

name: remediate-azure-nsg-revoke description: >- Use when the user mentions "revoke open Azure NSG rule," "close Azure NSG public exposure," "respond to detect-azure-open-nsg," or "re-verify Azure NSG revoke." Surgical revoke of an Azure Network Security Group inbound rule flagged as open to * / Internet / 0.0.0.0/0 / ::/0 by detect-azure-open-nsg (T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application). Default mode is delete — calls NetworkManagementClient.security_rules.begin_delete() against the specific rule (the cleanest reversible op since NSG rule definitions are versioned by Azure Resource Manager). Opt-in --mode patch rewrites access: Deny for the same priority+source+destination tuple via begin_create_or_update(). Every action is dry-run by default, deny-listed against default*/Default* rule names, NSG names ending -protected, the parent NSG's intentionally-open tag, and any rule-fully-qualified-id in AZURE_NSG_REVOKE_DENY_RULE_IDS. Apply requires AZURE_NSG_REVOKE_INCIDENT_ID + AZURE_NSG_REVOKE_APPROVER plus an explicit allowed-subscription binding via AZURE_NSG_REVOKE_ALLOWED_SUBSCRIPTION_IDS. Dual audit (DynamoDB + KMS-encrypted S3). Reverify re-reads the rule via security_rules.get() and emits VERIFIED if the rule is gone (or patched to Deny), DRIFT (+ paired OCSF Detection Finding via the shared remediation_verifier contract) if the rule re-appears as Allow within the verification window, UNREACHABLE if the Azure API throws. Do NOT use to delete the entire NSG (deletes other legitimate rules), for AWS Security Groups (separate skill remediate-aws-sg-revoke), for GCP firewall (separate skill remediate-gcp-firewall-revoke), for Outbound NSG rules, or to bypass the deny-list. purpose: Use when the user mentions "revoke open Azure NSG rule," "close Azure NSG public exposure," "respond to detect-azure-open-nsg," or "re-verify Azure NSG revoke." Surgical revoke of an Azure Network Security Group inbou... capability: write-cloud persistence: cloud_state telemetry: stderr_jsonl privilege_escalation: read_write license: Apache-2.0 approval_model: human_required execution_modes: jit, ci, mcp, persistent side_effects: writes-cloud, writes-storage, writes-audit input_formats: ocsf, native output_formats: native concurrency_safety: operator_coordinated network_egress: management.azure.com, login.microsoftonline.com, s3.amazonaws.com, dynamodb.amazonaws.com caller_roles: security_engineer, incident_responder, platform_engineer approver_roles: security_lead, incident_commander, platform_owner min_approvers: 1 compatibility: >- Requires Python 3.11+, azure-identity + azure-mgmt-network (lazy-imported only under --apply / --reverify). Azure RBAC: Network Contributor on the parent NSG resource group for delete/patch; Reader is enough for --reverify. The skill runs under whatever Azure credentials DefaultAzureCredential resolves; cross-subscription orchestration belongs in the runner layer. metadata: homepage: https://github.com/msaad00/cloud-ai-security-skills source: https://github.com/msaad00/cloud-ai-security-skills/tree/main/skills/remediation/remediate-azure-nsg-revoke version: 0.1.0 frameworks: - MITRE ATT&CK v14 - NIST CSF 2.0 - SOC 2 - CIS Azure Foundations cloud: - azure

remediate-azure-nsg-revoke

What this closes

Pair skill for detect-azure-open-nsg (MITRE ATT&CK T1190 — Exploit Public-Facing Application).

This is the Azure counterpart to remediate-aws-sg-revoke and remediate-gcp-firewall-revoke. Together with detect-azure-open-nsg, the Azure NSG closed loop becomes the third network-exposure response in the repo.

Why surgical revoke (not "delete the NSG")

The parent NSG hosts other legitimate rules (HTTPS:443 on a public endpoint, intra-VNet rules, AzureLoadBalancer health probes, etc.). Deleting the NSG breaks them. The detector identifies the specific offending rule by its fully-qualified Azure Resource Manager id; we delete (or patch to Deny) only that one rule and leave the rest of the NSG intact.

Modes

• --mode delete (default) — calls network_client.security_rules.begin_delete(). Cleanest reversible op since NSG rule definitions are versioned by Azure Resource Manager and easily re-created.
• --mode patch — opt-in. Calls begin_create_or_update() with the same priority+source+destination tuple but access: Deny, preserving the rule slot for forensic context.

Inputs

OCSF 1.8 Detection Finding (class 2004) from detect-azure-open-nsg. Required observables:

• target.uid — the rule's fully-qualified Azure Resource Manager id (REQUIRED). Format: /subscriptions/<sub>/resourceGroups/<rg>/providers/Microsoft.Network/networkSecurityGroups/<nsg>/securityRules/<rule>
• target.name — the rule name (used for deny-list match)
• region, account.uid (subscription id) — audit context
• rule.source_prefix[], rule.port[] — what to revoke (REQUIRED for --mode patch; missing yields a skip in patch mode but delete only needs target.uid)
• actor.name, rule — audit context

Do NOT use

• To delete the entire NSG (use the Azure portal or a separate destroy skill)
• For AWS Security Group changes (use remediate-aws-sg-revoke)
• For GCP firewall changes (use remediate-gcp-firewall-revoke)
• For Outbound NSG rules (different threat surface)
• To bypass the deny-list, run --apply without an explicit human-approved incident window, or edit the audit trail by hand
• For audit/discovery — this skill writes; for inventory use discover-environment

Guardrails (enforced in code)

Run

# Dry-run plan (default)
python skills/remediation/remediate-azure-nsg-revoke/src/handler.py findings.ocsf.jsonl

# Apply (after out-of-band approval)
export AZURE_NSG_REVOKE_INCIDENT_ID=INC-2026-04-20-001
export AZURE_NSG_REVOKE_APPROVER=alice@security
export AZURE_NSG_REVOKE_ALLOWED_SUBSCRIPTION_IDS=00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001
export AZURE_NSG_REVOKE_AUDIT_DYNAMODB_TABLE=azure-nsg-revoke-audit
export AZURE_NSG_REVOKE_AUDIT_BUCKET=acme-azure-nsg-audit
export KMS_KEY_ARN=arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:111122223333:key/...
# Optional: pin rules that should never be auto-revoked
export AZURE_NSG_REVOKE_DENY_RULE_IDS=/subscriptions/.../securityRules/r1,/subscriptions/.../securityRules/r2
python skills/remediation/remediate-azure-nsg-revoke/src/handler.py findings.ocsf.jsonl --apply

# Re-verify (read-only)
python skills/remediation/remediate-azure-nsg-revoke/src/handler.py findings.ocsf.jsonl --reverify

# Patch instead of delete
python skills/remediation/remediate-azure-nsg-revoke/src/handler.py findings.ocsf.jsonl --apply --mode patch

Required Azure RBAC

The execution principal needs:

• Network Contributor on the parent NSG resource group (covers Microsoft.Network/networkSecurityGroups/securityRules/delete and .../write)
• Reader on the same scope is enough for --reverify

The dual-audit sink also needs the same AWS DynamoDB + S3 + KMS permissions used by the AWS / GCP siblings (the audit storage layer is unified, even though the cloud surface is Azure).

Non-goals

• Deleting the NSG entirely
• Tag-based discovery of NSG rules to revoke (this skill is finding-driven)
• Cross-subscription auto-revoke (the skill now fails closed unless the target subscription is named explicitly in AZURE_NSG_REVOKE_ALLOWED_SUBSCRIPTION_IDS)
• Posture-at-rest scanning (use cspm-azure-cis-benchmark)

See also

• detect-azure-open-nsg — paired source detector
• remediate-aws-sg-revoke — AWS sibling
• remediate-entra-credential-revoke — Azure identity-side sibling
• _shared/remediation_verifier.py — verification contract
• docs/HITL_POLICY.md — repo-wide HITL bar