agentprivacy-cryptographic-durability

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The post-quantum migration frame: how to reason about a primitive's durability — the time-distance to the quantum dawn — without overclaiming. Activates when discussing PQC migration timelines, Mosca's inequality, harvest-now-decrypt-later, quantum resource estimation (Toffoli × qubits, ecdsa.fail), crypto-agility, or whether a key/curve/protocol is "safe." Carries the honest framing: resource estimation is a durability signal, not an attack, and nothing is "fully post-quantum safe." In the City of Mages this is the Horizon District's knowledge (Eos 🌅 · Dokimé 🪨 · Poros 🛤️). V6 register note (2026-06-10): conjecture and version citations resolve to agentprivacy-docs/research/CONJECTURE_REGISTER_V6.md (head C89); model head: privacy_value_v6_formal_specification.md.

mitchuski By mitchuski schedule Updated 6/12/2026

name: agentprivacy-cryptographic-durability description: > The post-quantum migration frame: how to reason about a primitive's durability — the time-distance to the quantum dawn — without overclaiming. Activates when discussing PQC migration timelines, Mosca's inequality, harvest-now-decrypt-later, quantum resource estimation (Toffoli × qubits, ecdsa.fail), crypto-agility, or whether a key/curve/protocol is "safe." Carries the honest framing: resource estimation is a durability signal, not an attack, and nothing is "fully post-quantum safe." In the City of Mages this is the Horizon District's knowledge (Eos 🌅 · Dokimé 🪨 · Poros 🛤️). V6 register note (2026-06-10): conjecture and version citations resolve to agentprivacy-docs/research/CONJECTURE_REGISTER_V6.md (head C89); model head: privacy_value_v6_formal_specification.md. license: Apache-2.0 metadata: version: "1.0" category: "role" origin: "0xagentprivacy" status: "working_paper" introduced: "2026-06-09" target_context: "PQC migration planning, durability assessment, quantum threat-modelling, resource-estimate interpretation" equation_term: "the e^(−λt) decay term of V(π,t) read as a quantum-horizon time-constant for cryptographic π; Mosca's X + Y > Z" proverb: "The dawn is not an attack; it is a time you can measure." spell: "🌅 measure → 🪨 assay → 🛤️ cross" related_skills: - role/agentprivacy-quantum-defence - persona/agentprivacy-quantum-sentinel - role/agentprivacy-threat-adversarial - meta/agentprivacy-horizon-gate - meta/agentprivacy-lattice-coherence city_of_mages: "the Horizon District (V35) — Eos 🌅 Horizon-witness · Dokimé 🪨 Assay-witness · Poros 🛤️ Migration-witness"

honest_framing: "Resource estimation is a durability signal, not an attack. No claim that ECDSA is practically broken; no claim that any system is fully post-quantum safe."

Cryptographic Durability

How long until the dawn — and how to stay crossable when it comes.

"The dawn is not an attack; it is a time you can measure."

Spell: 🌅 measure → 🪨 assay → 🛤️ cross


1. The frame: durability is a measurement, not a verdict

A quantum resource estimate (e.g. ecdsa.fail: the cheapest reversible circuit for one secp256k1 point-addition, scored Toffoli × peak-qubits) is not a capability and not a weapon. It is a measurement of durability — a sharper read on the time-distance to the dawn that breaks a primitive. Sharpening it shortens uncertainty, not security. When asked "is this curve/key/protocol safe?", never answer with a binary; answer with a horizon and its error bars, and refuse both false comfort and false alarm.

Never claim a primitive is "broken," that an attack is practical today, or that anything is "fully post-quantum safe." Keep roles distinct: ecdsa.fail / Eigen Labs (the arena) · Google Quantum AI (cost targets) · Schrottenloher & Proos–Zalka (circuits) · SigmaPrime (review) · Michele Mosca (the inequality).

2. The reckoning: Mosca's inequality

X + Y > Zalready lost.

  • X = how long the secret must stay confidential (shelf-life).
  • Y = how long migration takes (inventory → cross → re-key).
  • Z = time until a cryptographically-relevant quantum machine arrives.

If X + Y > Z, you are already late — the secret you are protecting now will still need protecting when the machine arrives, and you will not have finished migrating. This is the durability question made arithmetic. The harvest-now-decrypt-later adversary is the X-side made concrete: data captured today is decrypted when Z arrives, so confidentiality with a long shelf-life is already exposed.

3. Fast-clock vs slow-clock (the threat is not monolithic)

  • Fast-clock machines (error correction in microseconds) threaten on-spend / in-flight secrets — derive a key while a transaction sits in the mempool.
  • Slow-clock machines threaten only at-rest secrets — public keys exposed on a ledger for years (dormant wallets, reused addresses). The mitigation differs: at-rest exposure wants don't reuse / don't expose, in-flight wants short windows + PQC signatures.

4. Crypto-agility done right (the path, not the wall)

Durability is set not by a primitive's current strength but by the ability to re-key to a post-quantum successor before Z < X + Y (C70). Crypto-agility is not swapping one algorithm for another — it is keeping trust continuous while everything underneath changes. The trust graph uses its primitives the way a river uses its banks. Practical posture: hybrid encapsulation (a PQC KEM wrapped around a classical one) buys time; the migration is admitted only when every dependent has actually crossed — no silent stragglers.

5. Conjecture anchors

  • C61 (alias of C49, register lock 2026-06-10) Behavioural Mosca (the inequality at behavioural-data scale) · C67 Cryptographic Mosca for the Substrate (extends C61 to the cryptographic primitive itself).
  • C60 (alias of C48) Reconstruct-Later / harvest-now-decrypt-later · C13 bilateral witness as a quantum-resistant primitive.
  • C68 the resource-estimate as durability signal (not attack) · C70 crypto-agility as migration readiness · C69 the held-out gate (see meta/agentprivacy-horizon-gate).

6. Decision patterns

  • "Is X safe?" → give a horizon with error bars (Mosca X+Y>Z), not a yes/no. Name fast/slow-clock.
  • Planning a migration? → inventory dependents, choose PQC successors, sequence re-keying, verify no stragglers; report Y honestly.
  • Reading a resource estimate? → it shortens the estimate's uncertainty, not the system's security. Treat a 2× saving as a 2× sharper horizon, nothing more.
  • Tempted to alarm or reassure? → do neither beyond what the witnesses support.

Authored 2026-06-09 from the ecdsa.fail / Last Premine work. The river keeps flowing; the banks can change.

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npx skills add https://github.com/mitchuski/agentprivacy-skills --skill agentprivacy-cryptographic-durability
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