install-tend - SKILL.md Agent Skill

name: install-tend description: Sets up tend — an autonomous junior maintainer for a GitHub repo, powered by Claude or OpenAI Codex — that reviews PRs, triages issues, and fixes CI. Creates config, generates workflows, configures secrets and branch protection via API, creates the bot account, and provisions the harness auth token (Claude OAuth or OpenAI API key). Use when setting up tend on a new repo or when asked to install/configure tend.

Install Tend

Set up tend on the current repo. If the user hasn't supplied a bot name, get one via AskUserQuestion before step 1 using the candidate-generation pattern from step 6 (<repo>-bot, <repo>-tend, tend-<repo>, parallel availability check, present available ones). The user can pick "Other" to supply a custom name.

When asking the user questions during these steps, use the AskUserQuestion tool — present concrete options when there are clear choices (e.g. bio stance, badge style, secret-migration confirmation).

When a question requires the user to do something off-screen (visit a URL, run a command, paste a value back), spell the next step out in the question or option description: the exact web link, the exact command. "Generate a token on the registry's site" is not enough — give the URL. The user should not have to ask "where do I do that?".

Kickoff

Before running step 1, choose the harness and lay out the plan:

Ask via AskUserQuestion which harness to use:
- Claude (Anthropic) — uses a Claude Code OAuth token (recommended for adopters with a Claude subscription) or a console.anthropic.com API key. OAuth draws from the subscription's usage limits; the API key bills per token, which fits when the user has no subscription to draw on or wants a dedicated billing surface and per-key revocation.
- Codex (OpenAI) — uses an OpenAI API key (pay-per-token). The auth.json subscription path is incompatible with tend's concurrent workflows (per-call refresh-token invalidation) and is being removed. Detail in ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/references/security-model.md.
List the steps you'll be running (the section headings below: Create config → Generate workflows → Branch protection → Skill overlay → Badge → Bot account → Harness auth → Bot token → Grant access → Bot bio → Commit) so the user knows what's coming.
Tell them it typically takes 5–10 minutes of their hands-on time (browser logins, OAuth approvals, occasional copy-paste); the agent drives the rest.
Confirm via AskUserQuestion ("Ready to start?") before beginning step 1. Don't proceed until they say yes.

Follow each step in order. Skip steps that are already done — check each prerequisite before acting. Derive REPO once at the start:

gh auth status
REPO=$(gh repo view --json nameWithOwner --jq '.nameWithOwner')
echo "$REPO"

Confirm with the user that $REPO is the canonical repo where tend will run — not a fork. Every command below passes --repo "$REPO" explicitly, so if the working directory is a fork clone, just override the variable with the canonical owner/name and continue; no need to touch git remotes.

Browser sessions

Step 6 (when the bot account must be created) and step 8's mint paths (8a/8b) need a browser session logged in as the bot. mcp__claude-in-chrome__* automation can drive both when available; otherwise, give the user URLs and wait for confirmation. Before acting as the bot, verify the logged-in user via the avatar menu.

1. Create config

Create .config/tend.yaml with at minimum bot_name, plus harness if the user chose Codex (the default Claude harness can be omitted). See README.md "Harnesses" for the comparison.

bot_name: <bot-name>
# For Codex, also:
# harness: codex
# effort: medium   # optional: low | medium | high | xhigh

Check whether the repo already has a bot token secret under a non-default name:

gh secret list --repo "$REPO" --json name --jq '.[].name'

If a bot-token-like secret exists (e.g., GH_BOT_TOKEN, ROBOT_PAT), suggest overriding the default name rather than creating a duplicate:

secrets:
  bot_token: GH_BOT_TOKEN

Any repo-level secret not in secrets.allowed triggers a tend check warning. Classify each non-bot secret and act now — don't defer:

Build/observability tokens (e.g., CODECOV_TOKEN, SENTRY_DSN) are fine at the repo level. Add them to the allowlist:
```
secrets:
  allowed: ["CODECOV_TOKEN"]
```
Release secrets (registry tokens like PYPI_TOKEN/NPM_TOKEN, signing keys, deploy credentials) at the repo level are reachable from any workflow run, including ones a write-access bot can trigger with no merge. Don't allowlist them. Migrate each to a GitHub Environment whose deployment policy pins to the admin-gated refs from §3 (the default branch and/or all tags). The bot can reach neither ref class, so it cannot reach the secret.

Migrate the secret: recreate it on the Environment, delete the repo-level copy (confirm via AskUserQuestion first), and set environment: <name> on the publishing job.

Configure the deployment policy. Allow whichever ref classes the workflow runs on:
```
REPO=<owner>/<repo>; ENV=<name>
DEFAULT_BRANCH=$(gh api "repos/$REPO" --jq .default_branch)
gh api --method PUT "/repos/$REPO/environments/$ENV" \
  -F 'deployment_branch_policy[protected_branches]=false' \
  -F 'deployment_branch_policy[custom_branch_policies]=true'
# Continuous-deploy on default branch:
gh api --method POST "/repos/$REPO/environments/$ENV/deployment-branch-policies" \
  -f "name=$DEFAULT_BRANCH" -f type=branch
# Release on tags (workflow has `on: push: tags:`):
gh api --method POST "/repos/$REPO/environments/$ENV/deployment-branch-policies" \
  -f 'name=*' -f type=tag
```
Verify:
```
gh api "/repos/$REPO/environments/$ENV/deployment-branch-policies" \
  --jq '.branch_policies | map({name, type})'
```
Each entry must match a ref class from §3 (default branch and/or all tags). Confirm before checking the box.

Then sweep deploy/publish workflows. Each must trigger on push: tags: or push: branches: [<default-branch>] (per §3 workflow design) and declare an Environment. The grep below catches the common shapes; it misses reusable workflows in other repos and over-matches pull_request_target references in expressions and step inputs, so read each hit:
```
grep -RniE 'tags:|workflow_dispatch|release:|schedule:|workflow_run|repository_dispatch|deployment:|pull_request_target' .github/workflows
```
An OIDC-to-cloud deploy has no secret to migrate; the Environment with its admin-gated deployment policy plus the cloud provider's trust policy is then the only control on that path.

The original repo-level secret value isn't readable (GitHub secrets are write-only), so a fresh token is needed. Ask the user via AskUserQuestion how to obtain it; recommend whichever fits the registry:
- CLI — if the registry has a token-issuing CLI (e.g., npm token create), run it and capture the token.
- Chrome — drive the registry's token page via mcp__claude-in-chrome (most registries — PyPI, crates.io, Docker Hub — only issue tokens via the web UI). Some registries (PyPI in particular) force a 2FA reauth at token-creation time; Chrome MCP can't drive that second factor. If the reauth prompt appears, fall back to Manual.
- Manual — user generates the token themselves on the registry's site and pastes it back.
Whichever route is chosen, include the exact token-creation URL in the question or option description (and in the follow-up message if manual). Common registries:
- PyPI: https://pypi.org/manage/account/token/
- npm: https://www.npmjs.com/settings/<user>/tokens/new (or npm token create)
- crates.io: https://crates.io/settings/tokens
- Docker Hub: https://app.docker.com/settings/personal-access-tokens
- GitHub Packages / deploy: https://github.com/settings/tokens
For other registries, look up the token page before asking. Accept any other route the user suggests. Never ask the user to dig the old token out of their password manager and re-paste it — issuing a fresh token and revoking the old one is part of the migration's point.

Discover existing CI workflows so tend-ci-fix can watch them:

grep -l 'push:\|pull_request' .github/workflows/*.yml .github/workflows/*.yaml 2>/dev/null

For each match, extract the workflow name: field. These are the workflows that run tests, linting, or builds — tend-ci-fix should watch them. Configure:

workflows:
  ci-fix:
    watched_workflows: ["ci", "lint"]  # names of workflows to watch

If no CI workflows exist, either skip ci-fix (enabled: false) or help the user create one first.

Ask via AskUserQuestion (multiSelect: true) which other overrides they want to set. Skip-all is fine — defaults are sensible:

Setup steps (system deps, language version, pre-build hooks)
Workflow conditions (e.g., skip review on tend:dismissed PRs — see below)
Schedule overrides (cron timing for nightly/weekly)
Permissions / timeouts on specific jobs
Top-level env vars

For each selected category, follow up with a free-text ask, then write the override into .config/tend.yaml. See the next subsection for override syntax.

Customizing generated workflow YAML

The generator owns every tend-*.yaml file — direct edits are lost on the next uvx tend@latest init. Instead, set workflow_extra (top-level) or jobs.<name> (job-level) overrides in .config/tend.yaml. Overrides follow RFC 7396 (JSON Merge Patch): mappings deep-merge, scalars and lists replace.

Common example — skip review on PRs labeled tend:dismissed (so authors can opt out of re-reviews after the initial pass). Because scalars replace under Merge Patch, the override must duplicate the default draft check:

workflows:
  review:
    jobs:
      review:
        if: "github.event.pull_request.draft == false && !contains(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name, 'tend:dismissed')"

See ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/references/tend.example.yaml for more override examples (extending permissions, timeouts, top-level env vars).

2. Generate workflows

uvx tend@latest init --with-install-test

--with-install-test adds a one-shot tend-install-test.yaml workflow that runs on the install PR to verify secrets are set and the committed workflows match the generator's current output. The next nightly regen runs uvx tend@latest init without the flag, and the init cleanup step removes the file from the default branch.

Verify workflow files appear in .github/workflows/tend-*.yaml. Run uvx tend@latest check to validate branch protection, secrets, and bot access.

Check for workflows using anthropics/claude-code-action:

grep -rl 'anthropics/claude-code-action' .github/workflows/ 2>/dev/null

If found, delete them — tend replaces claude-code-action entirely. Remind the user that team members should @-mention the bot account instead of @claude.

3. Ref protection

Two ref classes can land code that reaches a deploy or publish workflow: the default branch (via merge) and tags (via tag push). Restrict both to admin-only operations so every privileged code path chains back to an admin action. The bot has write, not admin, so it satisfies neither bypass.

Survey existing rulesets; skip any slot already covered:

gh api "repos/$REPO/rulesets" --jq '.[] | {name, target, enforcement}'

Merge restriction on the default branch. Create if missing:

gh api "repos/$REPO/rulesets" --method POST --input - << 'EOF'
{
  "name": "Merge access",
  "target": "branch",
  "enforcement": "active",
  "conditions": {
    "ref_name": { "include": ["~DEFAULT_BRANCH"], "exclude": [] }
  },
  "rules": [{ "type": "update" }],
  "bypass_actors": [{
    "actor_id": 5,
    "actor_type": "RepositoryRole",
    "bypass_mode": "exempt"
  }]
}
EOF

Tag operations. Same shape, applied to all tags. Pushing a new tag or moving an existing one becomes an admin operation; the bot can do neither. Skipping the "what pattern do your tags use?" question is deliberate: matching all tags removes a per-repo configuration choice and gives the chain a single, uniform rule.

gh api "repos/$REPO/rulesets" --method POST --input - << 'EOF'
{
  "name": "Tag operations",
  "target": "tag",
  "enforcement": "active",
  "conditions": {
    "ref_name": { "include": ["~ALL"], "exclude": [] }
  },
  "rules": [
    { "type": "creation" },
    { "type": "update" }
  ],
  "bypass_actors": [{
    "actor_id": 5,
    "actor_type": "RepositoryRole",
    "bypass_mode": "exempt"
  }]
}
EOF

creation blocks the bot from pushing a fresh admin-gated tag; update blocks rewriting an existing tag to point at a bot-controlled commit. The chain doesn't need deletion separately. Recreation is already blocked by creation, so a deleted tag can't be replaced with malicious code. Bot-deleting an admin-pushed tag is brief availability damage at worst; repos that need stronger protection against published-tag deletion can add a no-bypass deletion ruleset (see the publisher uplift below).

Release/deploy workflow design. Workflows that use release or deploy secrets must trigger on push: tags: (release) or push: branches: [main] (continuous deploy from the default branch), and reference an Environment (§1). Don't trigger on pull_request. A pull_request workflow runs the YAML at the PR's head ref, which a bot can write, so the workflow code is no longer admin-vetted and the chain breaks at the workflow file itself. Other triggers (workflow_dispatch, release: published, deployment, schedule) are outside the packaged recipe. Their workflow files run from the default branch (so code is admin-vetted), but they can be initiated by a write-scoped bot against an admin-gated ref, which means the env policy alone does not stop the bot from firing them at unwanted times. If a repo keeps such a trigger on a release/deploy workflow, treat it as a custom design and verify the trigger-specific proof (usually: gate the env with required reviewers on top of the chain) per workflow before migrating release or deploy secrets to that env.

More complicated approaches are possible (per-pattern tag rulesets, mixed bypass actors, layered no-bypass immutability rulesets for repos that publish actions consumed via tag pins, required-reviewer environment gates for per-deploy human approval). Install-tend packages the recipe above because it is the simplest configuration that holds the chain; adopters with stricter requirements can layer additional rulesets or environment protection rules on top.

4. Create skill overlay (recommended)

Create .claude/skills/running-tend/SKILL.md with tend-specific project guidance. This skill is loaded by tend workflows alongside the generic tend-* skills.

Do NOT duplicate CLAUDE.md and do NOT invent project conventions.

Ask via AskUserQuestion (multiSelect: true) which tend-specific preferences they want to capture. Skipping all is fine — the placeholder below covers that case.

PR title format (e.g., conventional commits, Jira ticket prefix)
Labels the bot should apply to its PRs
Review request routing (specific teams or people)
Target branch if not the default branch
Optional nightly actions (e.g., changelog maintenance — specify file and branch)

For each selected item, follow up with a free-text ask to capture the specifics, then write them into the overlay. If nothing is selected, create a placeholder:

No project-specific tend preferences yet. Add guidance here as
needed — this file is loaded by tend workflows alongside CLAUDE.md.

Build commands, test commands, code style, and project structure belong in CLAUDE.md — tend reads it like any other Claude session.

5. Offer to add a badge

If the repo has a README (any of README.md, README.rst, README), offer to add a "maintained with tend" badge.

Base URL (always include the logo):

https://img.shields.io/badge/maintained_with-tend-bba580?logo=

Match the style parameter used by existing badges in the README. For example, if the repo uses style=for-the-badge, append &style=for-the-badge to the URL. If no existing badges or no style parameter, use the default (no style parameter needed).

Wrap the image in a link to https://github.com/max-sixty/tend — always this exact URL, regardless of the consumer's org or repo name. The full markdown shape:

[![maintained with tend](<image-url>)](https://github.com/max-sixty/tend)

Use AskUserQuestion to confirm. Describe the badge briefly in the question ("an olive-green 'maintained with tend' badge with the tend wordmark") — do NOT paste the raw img.shields.io URL or its base64 logo blob into the chat; the blob is hundreds of characters of noise. The user only needs to decide yes/no, not eyeball the URL. Insert the markdown directly into the README on confirmation.

Place it near the top of the README — after the title/heading but before the first paragraph. If there are already badges on that line, append to the same line.

If no README exists, skip this step.

6. Bot account

gh api users/<bot-name> --jq '.login,.id' 2>/dev/null && echo "EXISTS" || echo "NOT FOUND"

If the account doesn't exist:

If the user hasn't chosen a name yet, generate three candidates (e.g. <repo>-bot, <repo>-tend, tend-<repo>), check availability in parallel, and present the available ones via AskUserQuestion:
```
for name in cand1 cand2 cand3; do
  gh api "users/$name" >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo "$name: TAKEN" || echo "$name: available"
done
```
Navigate Chrome to https://github.com/signup.
If a verification code is needed and an email-reading skill or MCP is available, use it to fetch the latest GitHub verification email (from:github subject:code); otherwise have the user paste the code.
After confirmation, re-verify via API.

7. Harness auth token

Branch on the harness chosen in Kickoff.

7a. Harness = claude

The Claude action accepts two auth modes; pick whichever the user has. The action prefers CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN when both are set.

gh secret list --repo "$REPO" --json name --jq '.[].name' \
  | grep -E -q '^(CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN|ANTHROPIC_API_KEY)$' \
  && echo "SET" || echo "NOT SET"

If not set, ask via AskUserQuestion which auth mode to use:

OAuth token (recommended for Claude subscribers) — sk-ant-oat01-… from claude setup-token. Draws from the subscription's usage limits. Token is advertised as 1-year.
API key — sk-ant-… from https://console.anthropic.com/settings/keys. Billed per token against the Console org. Pick this when there's no Claude subscription, when the bot should bill against a dedicated Console org, or when per-key revocation matters. Works for any repo.

For OAuth token: before offering the CLI option, check:

command -v claude — if missing, only offer Manual (point them at https://claude.com/claude-code to install).
uname — the bundled wrapper depends on bash + script(1) and has only been validated on macOS and Linux. On anything else (MINGW*, CYGWIN*, MSYS*, Windows_NT, etc.), only offer Manual.
CLI (recommended on macOS/Linux when claude is on PATH) — run the bundled wrapper, which invokes claude setup-token (OAuth 2.0 PKCE, opens browser):
```
TOKEN=$("${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/scripts/oauth-token.sh")
```
Manual — have the user run claude setup-token in their own terminal (any machine with Claude Code installed) and paste the sk-ant-oat01-… token back. Use this on Windows or when the wrapper errors out.

Then store the secret:

echo "$TOKEN" | gh secret set CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN --repo "$REPO"

For API key:

Have the user paste the sk-ant-… key, then store it:

gh secret set ANTHROPIC_API_KEY --repo "$REPO" --body "$KEY"

7b. Harness = codex

Codex uses OPENAI_API_KEY (pay-per-token, from https://platform.openai.com/api-keys). The subscription auth.json path is not supported — Codex rotates that refresh token on every API call and invalidates the prior one, so tend's concurrent workflows (review/mention/triage/nightly/…) would break each other's auth mid-run. See ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/references/security-model.md.

gh secret list --repo "$REPO" --json name --jq '.[].name' | grep -q OPENAI_API_KEY && echo "SET" || echo "NOT SET"

If not set, have the user paste the sk-… key. Store it:

gh secret set OPENAI_API_KEY --repo "$REPO" --body "$KEY"

8. Bot token and secret

The bot's token needs scopes repo, workflow, notifications, write:discussion, gist, and user (per-scope justifications in ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/references/tend.example.yaml).

This step checks what gh already stores for the bot, mints a token only if needed (8a or 8b), and pushes it to the repo secret (8c). It serves both the install sequence and a standalone Bot PAT scope-audit remediation; in the audit case it is the whole fix, and you close the issue once 8c verifies. <bot-name> is bot_name in .config/tend.yaml; $REPO derives as in the kickoff: gh repo view --json nameWithOwner --jq '.nameWithOwner' (confirm it names the canonical repo, not a fork).

Bot auth lives in a dedicated config dir, $HOME/.config/gh-bots/<bot-name>, with the token stored plaintext (mode 0600) via --insecure-storage — never the OS keychain, which gh keys by account name globally, so a keychain-backed bot login could overwrite the maintainer's own credential. The bot also never enters the default config, which git's gh credential helper answers as, so a stray git push can't land as the bot. The token is already a repo secret, so the on-disk copy adds no exposure. The dir is durable: scope audits and reinstalls read it to skip a fresh device flow. Full rationale: ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/references/security-model.md.

Three auth postures, one per command — never export a token for the session (git's gh helper would forward it):

Bot dir (gh auth …, gh api user): prefix with env -u GH_TOKEN -u GITHUB_TOKEN GH_CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/gh-bots/<bot-name>". Ambient env tokens otherwise hijack the reads and block the auth writes.
Bot via token (GH_TOKEN=$BOT_GH_TOKEN gh api …): each block reads the token, then skips its action if the read came back empty — an empty GH_TOKEN silently falls back to the maintainer's stored auth, and gh secret set accepts an empty body. Guards skip rather than exit because blocks may be pasted into the user's shell.
Maintainer (gh secret, the collaborator API in step 9): bare, on ambient auth. A 403 means that auth lacks admin — often a weak env token; env -u it to fall back to the stored login.

No step writes the maintainer's default config — and the bot must not sit there either (pre-dir installs put it there). If a bare gh auth token --user <bot-name> prints a token, evict it with env -u GH_TOKEN -u GITHUB_TOKEN gh auth logout --user <bot-name>; workflows run on the repo secret, so nothing breaks.

Check what the bot dir holds:

env -u GH_TOKEN -u GITHUB_TOKEN \
  GH_CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/gh-bots/<bot-name>" gh auth status 2>&1

A missing dir prints "not logged in", which is a routing answer, not an error to debug. Read the output:

Logged in as <bot-name> with a Token scopes: line listing all six scopes → skip to 8c.
Logged in as <bot-name>, scopes missing → refresh path (8a).
Not logged in here → login path (8b).

8a and 8b both run gh's device flow: the command prints a one-time code and polls until it is approved at https://github.com/login/device by a browser logged in as the bot (codes expire after ~15 minutes). Run the command yourself in the background, surfacing the code and URL; delegate to the user's terminal only if that fails, and then hand over the rest of the step's commands (8c, steps 9 and 10) fully substituted — the token lives on whichever machine ran the login. On Windows, run everything in Git Bash (bundled with Git for Windows); the snippets work unmodified.

8a. Refresh path (bot already in the bot dir)

env -u GH_TOKEN -u GITHUB_TOKEN \
  GH_CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/gh-bots/<bot-name>" \
  gh auth refresh --hostname github.com --insecure-storage \
  --scopes repo,workflow,notifications,write:discussion,gist,user

gh auth refresh has no --user flag; it operates on the dir's active account, the bot. Requested scopes merge with the stored token's while it is still valid (a revoked one yields just the six). No identity check is needed: a wrong-session approval makes refresh itself error ("received credentials for ") — have the user re-approve from the bot's session and rerun.

8b. Login path (first-time setup)

env -u GH_TOKEN -u GITHUB_TOKEN \
  GH_CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/gh-bots/<bot-name>" \
  gh auth login --hostname github.com --web \
  --insecure-storage \
  --scopes repo,workflow,notifications,write:discussion,gist,user

No --git-protocol here: that flag writes gh's credential helper into the global git config, host-wide (git config is not scoped by GH_CONFIG_DIR).

gh auth login stores whatever account approved the code, without checking. Verify before continuing:

env -u GH_TOKEN -u GITHUB_TOKEN \
  GH_CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/gh-bots/<bot-name>" gh api user --jq '.login'

This must print the bot name. Anything else means the wrong session approved the code; the token never left the bot dir, so delete the dir and rerun 8b before proceeding — no other account is affected:

rm -rf "$HOME/.config/gh-bots/<bot-name>"

8c. Push token to secret

Copy the bot's token to the repo secret (<secret-name> is the secrets.bot_token value from §1, default TEND_BOT_TOKEN; trust this over any name an audit issue quotes) and verify the Updated timestamp is fresh:

BOT_GH_TOKEN=$(env -u GH_TOKEN -u GITHUB_TOKEN \
  GH_CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/gh-bots/<bot-name>" gh auth token --user <bot-name>)
if [ -z "$BOT_GH_TOKEN" ]; then
  echo "bot token empty — fix step 8 first" >&2
else
  gh secret set <secret-name> --repo "$REPO" --body "$BOT_GH_TOKEN"
  gh secret list --repo "$REPO"
fi

9. Grant bot access

The collaborator PUT and final list run as the maintainer (they need admin); accepting the invitation runs as the bot. GitHub may grant access directly (204) without creating an invitation — accept only if one exists.

BOT_GH_TOKEN=$(env -u GH_TOKEN -u GITHUB_TOKEN \
  GH_CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/gh-bots/<bot-name>" gh auth token --user <bot-name>)
if [ -z "$BOT_GH_TOKEN" ]; then
  echo "bot token empty — fix step 8 first" >&2
else
  gh api "repos/$REPO/collaborators/<bot-name>" -X PUT -f permission=push
  INVITE_ID=$(GH_TOKEN=$BOT_GH_TOKEN gh api "user/repository_invitations" --jq ".[] | select(.repository.full_name == \"$REPO\") | .id")
  if [ -n "$INVITE_ID" ]; then
    GH_TOKEN=$BOT_GH_TOKEN gh api "user/repository_invitations/$INVITE_ID" -X PATCH
  fi
  gh api "repos/$REPO/collaborators" --jq '.[].login'
fi

10. Bot profile bio

Capture what the creator is comfortable with contributors/users asking the bot to do, then reflect that stance in the bot's profile bio (≤160 chars) so it's discoverable on the bot's user page. This is advisory — the bot doesn't gate behavior on it.

Ask the creator via AskUserQuestion which stance applies. Substitute <owner>/<repo> at ask time. Order options recommended-first and mark the recommended one explicitly:

tend agent for <owner>/<repo>. I triage issues and help maintain <repo>. (Recommended — invites issue/PR engagement without inviting open-ended Q&A)
tend agent for <owner>/<repo>. Feel free to ask me questions about <repo>. (Most permissive — invites contributor questions)
tend agent for <owner>/<repo>. I respond to maintainers of <repo>. (Most restrictive — limits engagement to maintainers)

Check the current bio as the bot — skip the write if it already matches:

BOT_GH_TOKEN=$(env -u GH_TOKEN -u GITHUB_TOKEN \
  GH_CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/gh-bots/<bot-name>" gh auth token --user <bot-name>)
if [ -z "$BOT_GH_TOKEN" ]; then
  echo "bot token empty — fix step 8 first" >&2
else
  GH_TOKEN=$BOT_GH_TOKEN gh api user --jq '.bio'
fi

Otherwise write it (requires user scope on the bot's token from step 8):

BOT_GH_TOKEN=$(env -u GH_TOKEN -u GITHUB_TOKEN \
  GH_CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/gh-bots/<bot-name>" gh auth token --user <bot-name>)
if [ -z "$BOT_GH_TOKEN" ]; then
  echo "bot token empty — fix step 8 first" >&2
else
  GH_TOKEN=$BOT_GH_TOKEN gh api user -X PATCH -f bio="<drafted bio>"
fi

11. Commit and push

Stage all changes:

git add .

Commit with co-author attribution. Do NOT push without explicit permission.

After pushing the install PR, wait for the tend-install-test workflow to pass before merging — it verifies the bot+harness secrets are set and that the committed workflow files match the generator's output. The file itself is removed on the next nightly regen, so future PRs won't trigger it.

Summary checklist

After completing all steps, present this checklist (harness-specific line picks the row that matches the chosen harness):

Config: .config/tend.yaml created (with harness set if Codex)
Workflows: generated in .github/workflows/
Rulesets: merge restriction on default branch (admin bypass), tag operations on all tags (admin bypass)
Release/deploy secrets: environment-protected; the environment's deployment-branch-policies list only the admin-gated refs from §3 (default branch and/or all tags)
Skill overlay: .claude/skills/running-tend/SKILL.md (tend-specific only)
Badge: offered to add to README (optional)
Bot account: <bot-name> exists on GitHub
Harness auth (claude): CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN or ANTHROPIC_API_KEY secret set
Harness auth (codex): OPENAI_API_KEY secret set
Bot token: the secrets.bot_token secret (default TEND_BOT_TOKEN) set with repo+workflow+notifications+write:discussion+gist+user scopes
Bot access: repo collaborator with write access, invitation accepted
Bot bio: profile bio reflects the authorization stance
Committed (push requires explicit permission)
tend-install-test workflow passed on the install PR before merging