name: security-fastapi description: |- Review FastAPI security audit patterns for dependencies and middleware. Use for auditing auth dependencies, CORS configuration, and TrustedHost middleware. Use proactively when reviewing FastAPI apps. Examples: - user: "Audit FastAPI route security" → check for Depends() and Security() usage - user: "Check FastAPI CORS setup" → verify origins when allow_credentials=True - user: "Review FastAPI middleware" → check TrustedHost and HTTPSRedirect config - user: "Secure FastAPI API keys" → move from query params to header schemes - user: "Scan for FastAPI footguns" → check starlette integration and dependency order
Security audit patterns for FastAPI applications covering authentication dependencies, CORS configuration, and middleware security.
Core Risks to Check
Missing Auth on Routes
FastAPI expects authentication/authorization via dependencies on routes or routers. If no Depends()/Security() usage exists, review every route for unintended public access.
from fastapi import Depends, Security
@app.get("/private")
async def private_route(user=Depends(get_current_user)):
return {"ok": True}
@app.get("/scoped")
async def scoped_route(user=Security(get_current_user, scopes=["items"])):
return {"ok": True}
API Key Schemes
If using API keys, SHOULD prefer header-based schemes (APIKeyHeader) and validate the key server-side.
from fastapi import Depends, FastAPI
from fastapi.security import APIKeyHeader
api_key = APIKeyHeader(name="x-api-key")
@app.get("/items")
async def read_items(key: str = Depends(api_key)):
return {"key": key}
CORS: Avoid Wildcards with Credentials
Using allow_origins=["*"] excludes credentialed requests (cookies/Authorization). For authenticated browser clients, MUST explicitly list allowed origins.
from fastapi.middleware.cors import CORSMiddleware
app.add_middleware(
CORSMiddleware,
allow_origins=["https://app.example.com"],
allow_credentials=True,
allow_methods=["*"],
allow_headers=["*"],
)
Host Header and HTTPS Enforcement
SHOULD use Starlette middleware to prevent host-header attacks and enforce HTTPS in production.
from starlette.middleware.trustedhost import TrustedHostMiddleware
from starlette.middleware.httpsredirect import HTTPSRedirectMiddleware
app.add_middleware(TrustedHostMiddleware, allowed_hosts=["example.com", "*.example.com"])
app.add_middleware(HTTPSRedirectMiddleware)
Quick Audit Commands
# Detect FastAPI usage
rg -n "fastapi" pyproject.toml requirements*.txt
# Find routes
rg -n "@app\.(get|post|put|patch|delete)" . -g "*.py"
# Check for auth dependencies
rg -n "Depends\(|Security\(" . -g "*.py"
# CORS config and wildcards
rg -n "CORSMiddleware|allow_origins|allow_credentials" . -g "*.py"
# TrustedHost/HTTPS middleware
rg -n "TrustedHostMiddleware|HTTPSRedirectMiddleware" . -g "*.py"
Hardening Checklist
- All sensitive routes require
Depends()orSecurity()auth dependencies - API key schemes use headers (
APIKeyHeader), not query params -
allow_originsis explicit whenallow_credentials=True -
TrustedHostMiddlewareconfigured for production domains -
HTTPSRedirectMiddlewareenabled in production (or enforced by proxy)
Scripts
scripts/scan.sh- First-pass FastAPI security scan