hunt-lateral-movement

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Hunt for lateral movement using PsExec, WMI, or similar techniques. Use when proactively searching for attackers moving through your network using admin tools. Searches for service installations, remote process execution, and suspicious network correlations.

dandye By dandye schedule Updated 2/4/2026

name: hunt-lateral-movement description: "Hunt for lateral movement using PsExec, WMI, or similar techniques. Use when proactively searching for attackers moving through your network using admin tools. Searches for service installations, remote process execution, and suspicious network correlations." required_roles: chronicle: roles/chronicle.editor gti: GTI Standard personas: [threat-hunter]

Lateral Movement Hunt Skill (PsExec/WMI)

Proactively hunt for signs of lateral movement using common administrative tools like PsExec or WMI abuse.

Inputs

  • TIME_FRAME_HOURS - Lookback period (default: 72)
  • (Optional) TARGET_SCOPE_QUERY - UDM query to narrow scope
  • (Optional) HUNT_HYPOTHESIS - Reason for the hunt
  • (Optional) HUNT_CASE_ID - SOAR case for tracking

Workflow

Step 1: Research Techniques

secops-mcp.get_threat_intel(query="MITRE T1021.002 SMB Admin Shares")
secops-mcp.get_threat_intel(query="MITRE T1047 WMI")
secops-mcp.get_threat_intel(query="MITRE T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer")

Step 2: Develop Hunt Queries

Query Placeholders

The queries below use placeholders that must be customized for your environment:

Placeholder Type Description
known_services Reference List Legitimate services spawned by services.exe. Define this list in Chronicle and populate with your environment baseline.
TARGET_IP IP Address Replace with the target system IP from your investigation context.
SOURCE_IP IP Address Replace with the source system IP from your investigation context.

PsExec Service Installation:

metadata.product_event_type = "ServiceInstalled" AND
target.process.file.full_path CONTAINS "PSEXESVC.exe"

PsExec Execution (services.exe spawning unusual processes):

metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH" AND
principal.process.file.full_path = "C:\\Windows\\System32\\services.exe" AND
target.process.file.full_path NOT IN @known_services  // Replace with your Chronicle reference list

WMI Process Creation:

metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH" AND
principal.process.file.full_path = "C:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\WmiPrvSE.exe" AND
target.process.file.full_path IN ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe")

WMI Remote Execution:

metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH" AND
principal.process.command_line CONTAINS "wmic" AND
principal.process.command_line CONTAINS "/node:" AND
principal.process.command_line CONTAINS "process call create"

PowerShell WMI Methods:

metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH" AND
target.process.file.full_path CONTAINS "powershell.exe" AND
(target.process.command_line CONTAINS "Invoke-WmiMethod" OR
 target.process.command_line CONTAINS "Invoke-CimMethod")

Combine with TARGET_SCOPE_QUERY if provided.

Step 3: Execute SIEM Searches

secops-mcp.search_security_events(text=query, hours_back=TIME_FRAME_HOURS)

Run each developed query.

Step 4: Network Correlation

If suspicious process activity found, correlate with network:

metadata.event_type = "NETWORK_CONNECTION" AND
target.port = 445 AND
target.ip = "TARGET_IP" AND      // Replace with actual target IP from findings
principal.ip = "SOURCE_IP"       // Replace with actual source IP from findings

Look for SMB connections temporally correlated with remote execution.

Step 5: Analyze Results

Look for anomalous patterns:

  • PsExec/WMI from unexpected sources (user workstations vs. admin servers)
  • Execution targeting many hosts rapidly
  • Suspicious commands executed via WMI
  • Temporal correlation between network connections and remote process execution

Step 6: Enrich Findings

If suspicious activity found:

For each suspicious entity (host, user):

secops-mcp.lookup_entity(entity_value=ENTITY)

For any discovered IOCs: Use /enrich-ioc

Step 7: Check Related Cases

Use /find-relevant-case with suspicious entities.

Step 8: Document & Conclude

Use /document-in-case:

  • Hunt hypothesis
  • Techniques hunted (T1021.002, T1047, etc.)
  • Queries used (with results)
  • Negative results explicitly noted
  • Suspicious findings with enrichment
  • Suggested follow-on actions

If lateral movement confirmed: → Trigger case_event_timeline_and_process_analysis for affected processes → Trigger compromised_user_account_response for involved users → Escalate to incident response

Required Outputs

After completing this skill, you MUST report these outputs:

Output Description
FINDINGS Detected lateral movement activity (events, processes, connections)
DETECTED_TECHNIQUES MITRE techniques observed (e.g., T1021.002, T1047)
AFFECTED_HOSTS Hosts involved in lateral movement (source and target systems)

Key Indicators

Technique Indicator Query Focus
PsExec PSEXESVC.exe service Service installation events
PsExec services.exe spawning Process parent-child
WMI WmiPrvSE.exe spawning Process parent-child
WMI wmic /node: Command line
General SMB port 445 Network connections
Install via CLI
npx skills add https://github.com/dandye/ai-runbooks --skill hunt-lateral-movement
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