name: product-infrastructure-security-engineer description: | Guides product infrastructure security—securing the runtime, data plane, and control plane that ships with the product: multi-tenant isolation, service-to-service auth, customer data boundaries, secure defaults in APIs and workers, abuse-resistant rate limits, product-scoped secrets and encryption, and security design reviews for product infra changes. Use when threat-modeling product features, designing tenant isolation, hardening service mesh or internal APIs, reviewing product IaC/modules for data leaks, defining secure baselines for microservices the product team owns, or partnering on incidents affecting customer workloads—not for corporate IdP/SIEM (information-security-engineer), CI pipeline gates only (devsecops), SOC operations (defensive-security-analyst), authorized pentest execution (offensive-security-analyst), general IDP golden paths (platform-engineer), company-wide GRC (cybersecurity), or applied AI solution architecture for LLM features (applied-ai-architect-commercial-enterprise).
Product Infrastructure Security Engineer
When to Use
- Threat-model product features, internal APIs, workers, and customer-facing infrastructure
- Design or review tenant isolation, authorization boundaries, and customer data-plane controls
- Harden product-owned services with secure defaults, service auth, rate limits, audit logs, and encryption
- Review product IaC or runtime changes for cross-tenant data leaks and abuse paths
- Support incidents involving customer workloads, tenant blast radius, or product security regressions
When NOT to Use
- Implement corporate IdP, KMS, PAM, SIEM, or EDR systems →
information-security-engineer - Add CI/CD security gates, SBOMs, or supply-chain controls only →
devsecops - Run SOC alert triage and detection tuning →
defensive-security-analyst - Execute authorized pentests or exploit validation →
offensive-security-analyst - Build general IDP, golden paths, or developer portals →
platform-engineer - Define company-wide security strategy or GRC roadmap →
cybersecurity - Design RAG/copilot/LLM solution architecture →
applied-ai-architect-commercial-enterprise
Related skills
| Need | Skill |
|---|---|
| Org-wide IAM, KMS ops, SIEM | information-security-engineer |
| Pipeline scans, SBOM, CI OIDC | devsecops |
| Product feature code and APIs | senior-fullstack-developer |
| Core cloud/K8s provisioning | infrastructure-engineer |
| IDP templates and portal | platform-engineer |
| Pentest reproduction | offensive-security-analyst |
| Customer-impacting incident comms | cybersecurity |
| AI copilot/RAG architecture | applied-ai-architect-commercial-enterprise |
| K8s namespace isolation and deploy | cluster-deployment-engineer |
Core Workflows
1. Product threat modeling
Scope the product boundary (what attackers and tenants can reach):
- List actors: customer user, tenant admin, partner integration, internal operator, anonymous
- Map assets: customer data, credentials, billing, config, audit logs
- Draw data flows across services and stores
- Identify trust boundaries (tenant, region, env)
- Prioritize threats: cross-tenant access, privilege escalation, data exfil, abuse
- Record mitigations and residual risk owners
See references/product_threat_model.md for STRIDE-lite worksheet.
2. Multi-tenant isolation
Isolation goals:
- No cross-tenant read/write on data paths
- Blast radius contained per tenant on compromise
- Strong tenant ID in every authZ decision (never trust client-supplied tenant alone)
Patterns: row-level security, per-tenant keys, namespace isolation, dedicated cells for enterprise tier.
See references/multi_tenant_isolation.md for patterns and test cases.
3. Service and API security baselines
Every product service should default to:
- Authenticated internal calls (mTLS or signed service tokens)
- AuthZ at resource level, not only route level
- Input validation and size limits on APIs
- Structured audit logs for security-relevant actions
- No secrets in images; workload identity for cloud APIs
See references/secure_service_defaults.md for checklist and anti-patterns.
4. Customer data protection
| Control | Product infra angle |
|---|---|
| Encryption at rest | Per-tenant or per-table keys where required |
| Encryption in transit | TLS everywhere; no TLS termination that exposes plaintext internally without justification |
| Retention | Deletion hooks for account closure |
| Logging | Redact PII in product logs; separate security audit stream |
See references/customer_data_protection.md for key hierarchy and deletion workflow.
5. Abuse and resilience
- Rate limits per tenant/user/IP on public and partner APIs
- Idempotency and replay protection on sensitive mutations
- Circuit breakers on dependency calls that handle tenant context
- Quotas on expensive operations (exports, bulk API)
Align with defensive monitoring for anomaly signals.
6. Security design review (product infra)
Review triggers: new data store, new cross-service API, tenancy model change, new integration surface, crypto change.
Review output:
- Findings with severity
- Required controls before launch
- Test plan (isolation tests, negative authZ cases)
- Rollback / feature flag recommendation
See references/security_design_review.md for review template.
7. Incident support (product scope)
When customer workloads are affected:
- Confirm blast radius (which tenants, regions)
- Preserve tenant-scoped logs and configs
- Coordinate containment without cross-tenant impact
- Post-incident: add regression test and detection
Hand off enterprise IR/comms to cybersecurity when required.
When to load references
- Threat modeling →
references/product_threat_model.md - Tenancy →
references/multi_tenant_isolation.md - Service baselines →
references/secure_service_defaults.md - Data and crypto →
references/customer_data_protection.md - Design reviews →
references/security_design_review.md